

The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: formal institutions and factional groups

ZHIYUE BO*

What was the political landscape of China as a result of the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? The answer is two-fold. In terms of formal institutions, provincial units emerged as the most powerful institution in Chinese politics. Their power index, as measured by the representation in the Central Committee, was the highest by a large margin. Although their combined power index ranked second, central institutions were fragmented between central party and central government institutions. The military ranked third. Corporate leaders began to assume independent identities in Chinese politics, but their power was still negligible at this stage. In terms of informal factional groups, the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group was the most powerful by a large margin. The Qinghua Clique ranked second. The Shanghai Gang and the Princelings were third and fourth, respectively. The same ranking order also holds in group cohesion indexes. The CCYL Group stood out as the most cohesive because its group cohesion index for inner circle members alone was much larger than those of the other three factional groups combined. The Qinghua Clique came second, and the Shanghai Gang third. The Princelings was hardly a factional group because its group cohesion index was extremely low. These factional groups, nevertheless, were not mutually exclusive. There were significant overlaps among them, especially between the Qinghua Clique and the Shanghai Gang, between the Princelings and the Qinghua Clique, and between the CCYL Group and the Qinghua Clique.

1. Introduction

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitutes the nucleus of the political system in China, and the leadership changes in the Central Committee, especially during the National Congress of the CCP, often reveal

* Zhiyue Bo is Assistant Professor and Chair of the Department of International Studies at St. John Fisher College in Rochester, New York. He is the author of *Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002). He would like to thank two anonymous referees, Suisheng Zhao, and Joseph Fewsmith for their comments on an earlier draft of this article, Roseanne Coco and Stephine M. Corso for their assistance in producing tables and figures, and St. John Fisher College for financial support. He would also like to thank the participants in the 16th Annual Meeting of the Association of Chinese Political Studies at which the earlier version of the article was presented. He is working on a manuscript on the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, tentatively entitled *Chinese Politics in the 21st Century: Political Transition and the Balance of Political Forces*.

fundamental changes in Chinese politics.¹ The 16th National Congress, held in Beijing from 8 to 14 November 2002, was one of the most significant events in Chinese politics in the early twenty-first century. As the first of its kind in the new century, the Congress not only elected a new leadership that would lead China in the next five years but also managed a generation change from the third to the fourth.

Although it is important to analyze personal characteristics of Central Committee members to understand the trends of personnel changes as most scholars of China studies usually do, it is more important to study institutional representation on the Central Committee because election to the Central Committee generally depends more on the post that a person holds in the Chinese political system than on personal characteristics.² For this reason, instead of providing a detailed description of personal characteristics of 16th Central Committee members, this article is going to focus on institutional representation on the 16th Central Committee. Moreover, this article also seeks to reveal informal dimensions of Chinese politics through an analysis of factional groups.

The article will start with an examination of the balance of power among formal institutions such as provincial units, central institutions, the military, and others. It will develop a power index based on the status of Central Committee members and compare the indexes across these formal institutions. It will then analyze the balance of power among factional groups such as the Shanghai Gang, the Princelings, the Qinghua Clique, and the CCYL Group. It will develop a group cohesion index for each of them and evaluate their group cohesion in comparative terms. It will also study factional overlaps and see to what extent these overlaps affect their interactions.

2. Balance of institutional power in the 16th Central Committee

There are three major institutions in China: provinces, central institutions, and the military. In a broad sense, as David Goodman correctly observed, leaders of these institutions form categorical groups that serve no political functions.³ However,

1. For analyses of previous central committees, see Franklin Houn, 'The Eighth Central Committee of the CCP', *American Political Science Review* 51(2), (June 1957), pp. 392–404; Donald W. Klein and Lois B. Hager, 'The Ninth Central Committee', *The China Quarterly* 45, (January–March 1971), pp. 37–56; Robert A. Scalapino, 'The transition in Chinese party leadership: a comparison of the Eighth and Ninth Central Committees', in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 67–148; Gordon A. Bennett, *China's Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Congresses, Constitutions, and Central Committees: An Institutional Overview and Comparison*, Occasional Paper, no. 1 (Austin: Center for Asian Studies, University of Texas, 1978); Hong Yung Lee, 'China's 12th Central Committee', *Asian Survey* 23(6), (June 1983), pp. 673–691; Li Cheng and Lynn White, 'The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: from mobilizers to managers', *Asian Survey* 28(4), (April 1988), pp. 371–399; Xiaowei Zang, 'The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: technocracy or political technocracy?' *Asian Survey* 33(8), (August 1993), pp. 787–803; David Shambaugh, 'The CCP's 15th Congress: technocrats in command', *Issues & Studies* 34(1), (January 1998), pp. 1–37; and Li Cheng and Lynn White, 'The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: full-fledged technocratic leadership with partial control by Jiang Zemin', *Asian Survey* 38(3), (March 1998), pp. 231–264.

2. This is called the 'principle of representation of institutions' in Soviet studies. See Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 458.

3. David S.G. Goodman, 'Provincial party first secretaries in national politics: a categorical or a political group?' in David S.G. Goodman, ed., *Groups and Politics in the People's Republic of China* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1984), pp. 68–82.

some categorical groups may serve as a basis for political articulation. For instance, although all provincial leaders belong to the same category, those provincial leaders who are also members of the Central Committee of the CCP may serve as a basis for a political group. As a group, their interests are different from those of central ministerial leaders.⁴ It is from this premise that we proceed to analyze the Central Committee representation from different institutions of the Chinese political system. Since there have been a lot of changes since November 2002 when the 16th CC was elected, we will identify Central Committee members by their affiliation in November 2002 and indicate the changes ever since.

2.1. Provincial representation

Evidently, provincial leaders emerged as the most powerful group in Chinese politics as a result of the 16th Congress of the CCP. In the Politburo, provincial leaders were very prominent. Out of 24 full members, ten (41.7%) were provincial leaders. Out of nine standing members, two (22.2%) were provincial leaders. However, if one included those who had just been transferred from the provincial units,⁵ provincial representation in the Politburo and the Standing Committee would be 13 (54.2%) and four (44.4%), respectively. In the 16th CC, 154 people (43%) were from provincial units, the largest group.

2.1.1. Elite provincial units. The number of provincial units that enjoy the status of elite provinces⁶ is unprecedented in the history of the People's Republic of China (Table 1). In addition to the four elite provincial units (Beijing, Shanghai, Shandong and Guangdong) previously, six more provincial units were upgraded to this status. Tianjin became an elite provincial unit in November 1987 along with Beijing, Shanghai and Sichuan, when its party secretary, Li Ruihuan, was inducted into the Politburo. However, when Tan Shaowen, a Politburo member and party secretary of Tianjin, passed away in February 1993, Tianjin's elite provincial status went away with him because Tan's successor, Gao Dezhan, did not inherit his seat in the Politburo. Now the promotion of Zhang Lichang, party secretary of Tianjin, to the Politburo restored Tianjin's elite provincial status. Similarly, this is true for Sichuan. Sichuan became an elite province in 1987 when Yang Rudai was elevated to the Politburo but lost that seat five years later when Yang retired and his successor was not able to make it to the Politburo.⁷ In 2002, Party Secretary Zhou Yongkang made it not only to the Politburo but also to the Secretariat. Sichuan's

4. Nevertheless, it is incorrect to assume that in China leaders of one institution always act in concert against those of other institutions.

5. He Guoqiang (Chongqing), Huang Ju (Shanghai) and Jia Qinglin (Beijing) were transferred to the Center only two weeks before the convention of the 16th Party Congress.

6. For a definition and detailed discussion of elite provinces, see Zhiyue Bo, *Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), especially pp. 19–35.

7. Some blamed Governor Xiao Yang for the loss. See Lijian Hong, 'Provincial leadership and its strategy toward the acquisition of foreign investment in Sichuan', in Peter T.Y. Cheung, Jae Ho Chung and Zhimin Lin, eds, *Provincial Strategies of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 392–395.

Table 1. Elite provincial units in China (1969–2002)

	1969		1973		1977		1987		1992		1997		2002		Total
	ccpf	ccpa	ccpf	ccpa	ccpf	ccpa	ccpf	ccpa	ccpf	ccps	ccpf	ccps	ccpf	ccps	
Beijing	2	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	10
Tianjin	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	3
Hebei	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Shanxi	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Liaoning	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Shanghai	2	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	11
Jiangsu	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Zhejiang	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Anhui	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Shandong	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	3
Henan	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
Hubei	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Hunan	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Guangdong	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	5
Guangxi	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Sichuan	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3
Tibet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Shaanxi	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Xinjiang	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3
Total	8	3	7	3	1	2	6	2	4	5	1	5	8	2	55

Notes: ccpf = full members of the Politburo; ccpa = alternate members of the Politburo; ccps = standing members of the Politburo; ccvc = vice chairmen of the Central Committee. Source: Updated from Zhiyue Bo, *Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), Table 2.3, p. 25.

elite provincial status was restored for the time being, but soon was lost again due to the departure of Zhou.⁸

Jiangsu was not a complete stranger to the elite provincial status if we trace its history back to the Cultural Revolution. It was one of a few elite provinces in 1969 when the chairman of the Jiangsu Revolutionary Committee, Xu Shiyou, was made a full Politburo member at the First Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee.⁹ However, after Xu was transferred away in 1973, none of his successors were Politburo members. Jiangsu regained its elite provincial status largely due to the person of the party secretary, Hui Liangyu. Hui, a native of Jilin, was a rising star in Chinese politics. Since 1987, he has served in four provinces (Jilin, Hubei, Anhui and Jiangsu) as well as in the Center. He became party secretary of Anhui in 1998 and was transferred to Jiangsu as party secretary in 1999. His promotion to the Politburo, therefore, was more of the promotion of the person than the promotion of the province. In fact, Hui has recently been transferred to the Center,¹⁰ ending Jiangsu's elite provincial status.

In contrast, the promotion of Zhang Dejiang to the Politburo was more of the promotion of the province than the promotion of the person. Zhejiang is well known as a province of 'red' capitalists. In 2001, there were 1.79 million private firms in Zhejiang. The booming non-public sector contributed 43.5% of the total provincial GDP, compared to 33% nationally.¹¹ In view of Jiang Zemin's preference for red capitalists, it is understandable that the party boss of the province of red capitalists was elevated to the Politburo. Zhang's résumé, however, is less impressive. A student of Korean language at Yanbian University during the Cultural Revolution, he received a diploma in economics in 1980 from the Kim Il-sung Comprehensive University in North Korea. Before 2002, he had worked in two provinces as well as in the Center. He was promoted to party secretary of Jilin in 1995 and was transferred to Zhejiang as party secretary in 1998, replacing the party boss of ten years (Li Zemin). He has been very supportive of central policies regarding joining the WTO and made the pledge to take one step ahead for Zhejiang to realize the goal of basic modernization.¹² He was recently transferred to Guangdong to replace Li Changchun.

Hubei does not have any history as an elite province and its promotion to that status was mainly due to its new party secretary, Yu Zhengsheng. A Princeling with close connections with Deng Pufang, son of Deng Xiaoping, Yu seems to possess all the right credentials for a Politburo member. A technocrat with extensive experience in local government as well as in the Center, he was transferred to

8. He became minister of Public Security in addition to his responsibilities in the Secretariat and the Politburo. Zhang Xuezhong, minister of Personnel and a full-member, replaced him as party secretary of Sichuan.

9. Jiangsu's elite provincial status, admittedly, was mainly due to the person of Xu Shiyou, who was also the commander of the Nanjing Military Region.

10. He is vice premier of the State Council.

11. Zhao Huanxin, 'Zhejiang ranks as wealthy province', *China Daily*, (13 November 2002). See http://www3.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2002-11/12/content_143595.htm, accessed on 20 November 2002.

12. For a brief discussion of Zhang Dejiang's policy statements for Zhejiang, see Zhiyue Bo, 'Governing China in the early 21st century: provincial perspective', *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 2(1-2), (2002), pp. 125-170.

Hubei as party secretary in November 2001 and became a Politburo member one year later.

The most interesting case of all, however, is that of Xinjiang. Xinjiang enjoyed a semi-elite provincial status in the 1970s, when its First Party Secretary, Seypidin Azizi,¹³ made it to the Politburo as an alternate member. His successor, Wang Feng, was a full member of the Central Committee but not a Politburo member. Now Party Secretary Wang Lequan's promotion is indeed the promotion of the region as well. Given Jiang Zemin's western development strategy, the position of Xinjiang has become more prominent economically as well as strategically.

Geographically, elite provincial units were more evenly distributed than before. They included two in the North (Beijing and Tianjin), four in the East (Shanghai, Shandong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang), two in the Central-South (Guangdong and Hubei), one in the Southwest (Sichuan), and one in the Northwest (Xinjiang). Except for the Northeast, all the other regions were represented. In terms of three major economic areas, the Eastern Area is over-represented by a large margin. Seven out of 12 provincial units¹⁴ in the area had Politburo seats. In addition to three centrally administered municipalities, four provinces were represented in the Politburo and two of them (Shandong and Guangdong) were represented in the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The Central Area¹⁵ was least represented, with only one elite province (Hubei). However, this was better than before. The Western Area¹⁶ was better represented in the Politburo than the Central Area, with two elite provincial units (Sichuan and Xinjiang). Most importantly, in contrast to Tibet whose elite provincial status had been ephemeral in 1992 when Hu Jintao was elevated to the Standing Committee of the Politburo, it seems that Xinjiang, also a minority region, may stay in this status for a while.

2.1.2. Provincial Central Committee representation. All provincial units except Taiwan were represented in the 16th CC (Table 2). The 31 provincial units that had representation in the 15th CC were all represented in the 16th CC. On average, there were about two full members from these provincial units, with only three exceptions. Tibet and Chongqing each had three full members; and Xinjiang had four full members. With only one exception, all provincial party secretaries and governors were full members. The exceptional case was Lu Ruihua, governor of Guangdong. He was expected to retire from his position. Huang Huahua, a deputy secretary and a vice governor as well as a full member, was a candidate for his position and indeed replaced him later on. In the cases of Tibet and Chongqing, in addition to party secretaries and governors, the chairmen of the Standing Commit-

13. He was the only Uygur in the history of the People's Republic of China who was the First Party Secretary of this minority region. All the other party secretaries in the region have been of Han nationality. For a detailed analysis of the Party's efforts to control minority regions, see Bo, *Chinese Provincial Leaders*, pp. 60–64.

14. They are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan and Liaoning.

15. It includes nine provincial units: Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi and Anhui.

16. It includes ten provincial units: Chongqing, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Tibet, Shanxi, Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan. For the division of the three areas, see <http://www.anderson.ucla.edu:7777/research/globalwindow/china/t8/sup1art.htm>, accessed on 10 March 2003.

Table 2. Provincial CC representation (1969–2002)

	1969		1973		1977		1982		1987		1992		1997		2002		Index
	ccf	cca	ccf	cca	ccf	cca	ccf	cca	ccf	cca	ccf	cca	ccf	cca	ccf	cca	
Beijing	5	4	5	6	4	4	1	3	2	3	3	1	2	2	2	3	9
Tianjin	3	1	4	0	4	1	4	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	9
Hebei	4	1	5	1	5	1	2	4	1	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	6
Shanxi	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	7
Inner Mongolia	3	1	4	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	7
Liaoning	6	1	6	2	5	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	7
Jilin	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	1	2	1	2	0	2	2	6
Heilongjiang	2	2	2	5	3	3	3	2	3	0	2	4	2	2	2	3	7
Shanghai	6	4	9	4	6	4	3	2	1	5	2	2	3	2	2	2	7
Jiangsu	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	1	3	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	8
Zhejiang	3	3	3	3	2	4	3	3	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	9
Anhui	1	2	3	2	3	1	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	3	7
Fujian	3	3	1	2	4	1	3	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	6
Jiangxi	2	1	1	5	4	2	2	1	2	1	2	3	2	1	2	3	7
Shandong	5	1	4	3	4	2	1	4	3	2	2	4	2	2	2	4	11
Henan	4	4	5	2	3	5	1	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	7
Hubei	6	2	5	5	5	2	5	2	3	0	1	3	2	2	2	3	9
Hunan	2	2	3	4	4	2	2	4	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	6
Guangdong	6	3	9	3	5	4	3	4	3	3	2	4	2	2	4	6	13
Guangxi	1	2	3	2	2	4	3	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	7
Sichuan	6	6	5	8	4	4	3	4	3	2	2	4	2	2	4	4	11
Guizhou	0	3	3	1	2	1	3	2	3	2	2	1	2	1	2	3	7
Yunnan	4	2	3	3	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	7
Tibet	1	2	2	2	3	2	3	1	3	1	3	2	2	2	3	2	8
Shaanxi	2	3	2	3	2	2	3	1	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	7
Gansu	5	2	4	1	4	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	0	2	2	3	7
Qinghai	1	4	0	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	6
Ningxia	0	3	0	4	1	3	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	6
Xinjiang	2	4	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	13
Hainan																	6
Chongqing																	6
Hong Kong																	8
Macao																	2
Total	91	75	104	89	98	73	69	64	66	53	62	69	63	49	67	87	246

Notes: ccf = full members of the Central Committee; cca = alternate members of the Central Committee. Source: Updated from Zhiyue Bo, *Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), Appendix 2.2, p. 35.

tees of their Provincial (or Regional) People's Congresses were also full members. Xinjiang, however, had another full-member deputy secretary¹⁷ and a full member from the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.¹⁸ Zhang Qingli, commander of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, was elevated to a full member of the 16th CC, skipping the level of alternate membership. Because of these three exceptions, the mean of the full membership from provinces in the 16th CC (2.061) was slightly higher than that in the 15th CC (2.032), with a much larger standard deviation (0.496 vs. 0.180).

For the first time, Hong Kong and Macao were also represented in the Central Committee of the CCP. Tung Chee-hwa (Dong Jianhua in Pinyin),¹⁹ governor of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), nevertheless, did not make it to the Central Committee because he was not a CCP member. Gao Siren, director of the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong SAR, was elevated to a full member of the 16th CC. A native of Qingdao in Shandong and a graduate of Hefei Industrial University, Gao spent his whole career in Guangdong. In 1991, he became a standing member of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee and party secretary of Guangzhou. He entered the 14th Central Committee as an alternate member in 1992 and was promoted to a deputy secretary of Guangdong in 1998.²⁰ In November 1999, he was transferred to Hong Kong as deputy director of the Liaison Office and was appointed director of the office three years later, replacing his predecessor, Jiang Enzhu.²¹

Similarly, Edmund Ho Hau-wah (He Houhua in Pinyin), governor of the Macao Special Administrative Region (SAR), did not make it to the 16th CC for the same reason as Tung Chee-hwa. Bai Zhijian, director of the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in the Macao SAR, was elevated to a full-member of the 16th CC. A native of Wuhan, Hubei, Bai spent his whole career in agriculture. After 22 years in agriculture, he was transferred to Inner Mongolia as a deputy secretary in August 1998.²² He was appointed director of the Liaison Office of the Central

17. Zhou Shengtao was one of the potential candidates for the position of party secretary in Sichuan. However, Zhang Xuezhong was sent down from the Center to assume the position.

18. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps is also partially under the leadership of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. In October 1954, the Central People's Government instructed the PLA in Xinjiang to demobilize there to be engaged in production. Beginning in May 1956, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps was placed under the dual leadership of the Ministry of Agricultural Cultivation and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. For a detailed introduction, see Publicity Office of the State Council, 'Xinjiang de lishi yu fazhan' ['The history and development of Xinjiang'], *People's Daily* (overseas edition), (27 May 2003), pp. 2-3.

19. Tung was born in Shanghai. If the birthplace were the criterion for being a member of the Shanghai Gang, he obviously would be qualified.

20. Shen Xueming and Zheng Jianying, eds, *Zhonggong Diyijie zhi Dishiwujie Zhongyangweiyuan* [The Central Committee Members of the Chinese Communist Party from the First through the Fifteenth Central Committee] (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian chubanshe, 2001), pp. 655-656.

21. Jiang became the bureau chief of Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong in July 1997 and was made a full member of the 15th Central Committee in the same year. He was appointed director of the Liaison Office in January 2000. In view of these facts, Jiang was the first Hong Kong central committee member. For Jiang's biography, see Shen Xueming and Zheng Jianying, *The Central Committee Members*, p. 590.

22. Shen Xueming and Han Honghong, eds, *Zhonggong Dishiwujie Zhongyangweiyuanhui Zhongyang Jilujian-chaweiyuanhui Weiyuan Minglu* [Who's Who in the Fifteenth Central Committee and Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Chinese Communist Party] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999), p. 381.

People's Government in the Macao SAR in October 2001 and became a full member of the 16th CC a year later.

The provincial alternate-member representation, in contrast, was much more diverse across provincial units. First, Hong Kong and Macao did not have any alternate members. Second, Guangdong, Shandong and Sichuan stood out as provinces with the largest numbers of alternate members. Guangdong had six alternate members, and Shandong and Sichuan each had four. Third, all the remaining provincial units had two-to-three alternate members. On average, the provincial alternate-member representation was 2.637,²³ half a seat more than that of the provincial full-member representation. The standard deviation, on the other hand, was 1.055, much larger than that of the full-member representation (0.496).

In terms of absolute numbers, provinces contributed 68 full members and 87 alternate members. Compared to five years ago, provinces had six more full members and 38 more alternate members in 2002. Clearly, provinces were the largest group by a wide margin in terms of alternate members in the 16th CC. Fifty-five percent of alternate members came from provinces, and the next largest group (central organs) took only 20%.

2.1.3. Provincial Central Committee index. In order to make possible a comparison across provinces as well as among different institutional groups, we are going to produce a Central Committee index (or power index) according to the following scheme.²⁴ An alternate member of the Central Committee receives one point, a full member two, an alternate Politburo member one more, a full Politburo member two more, a standing Politburo member three more, and the general secretary five more. In addition, members of the Secretariat receive one more point each; and members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) receive one more point each and vice-chairmen of the CMC two more points each.²⁵

On average, the provincial Central Committee index was 7.455 points, with a range between 2 and 13 (Table 2). Hong Kong and Macao were the lowest with only two points each, and Guangdong and Xinjiang were the highest with 13 points each. The prominence of Guangdong should be noted. With one standing Politburo member, one full member, and six alternate members, Guangdong was one of the two most powerful provincial units in China. With one Politburo member, four full members, and three alternate members, Xinjiang also shone as one of the political stars. Shandong and Sichuan followed with 11 points each. Interestingly enough, Shanghai did not stand out this time. With an index of only eight points, Shanghai was not even among the top eight. Obviously, Huang Ju's recent departure may have somewhat affected Shanghai's score.

The total scores from all provincial units were 246 points, representing 39% of the total scores and thus making provinces the most powerful institution in Chinese politics.

23. This is calculated including Hong Kong and Macao.

24. This is adapted from Bo, *Chinese Provincial Leaders*, p. 27.

25. Jiang Zemin is not in the picture because he is not a central committee member, even though he is Chairman of the CMC.

2.2. *Central representation*

The representation of central organs is much more fragmented. On the surface, it seems that many Central Committee members were from the Center. The total number of central leaders stood at 119, with 32 alternate and 87 full members. In other words, the central leaders represent the second largest group in the 16th CC overall and the largest group in terms of full members.

These numbers, however, are deceptive. First, nine central leaders did not belong to any particular central institution. These leaders, along with two military leaders in the Center, constitute the core of the Chinese political system. They include leaders from the Standing Committee of the Politburo (Hu Jintao, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong and Huang Ju), the State Council (Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Luo Gan, Wu Yi and Ismail Amat), and the Central Military Commission (Guo Boxiong and Cao Gangchuan). For instance, Hu Jintao, the general secretary, is the leader of the whole system, even though he was also president of the Central Party School. He should not be regarded as a representative of any ministerial-level central institution. Jia Qinglin and Huang Ju had just been uprooted from provinces and did not establish any central institutional identities. They should also be excluded from the computation of central representation. In the cases of Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo, they were both vice premiers. Zeng Qinghong was a leader in the Secretariat and the Politburo. None of them were concurrently ministerial (provincial) level leaders. Luo Gan was a State Councilor as well as the head of three separate committees under the Central Committee: the Committee of Politics and Law, the Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security, and the Committee of State Secrets. Hence, except for Shandong (Wu Guanzheng) and Guangdong (Li Changchun), no other provincial or ministerial level institutions were represented at the Standing Committee level.

Second, there is not a single system of ministerial-level central institutions. In fact, as far as the Central Committee is concerned, there are at least two separate central institutions: central party-institutions and central government-institutions. Central party-institutions include party organs directly under the Central Committee. Currently, there are 20 central party-institutions under the CC (Table 3). The most important are the four departments: Organization, Propaganda, United Front and International Liaison. At the time when the Politburo was elected in November 2002, three central party departments were represented: Organization (He Guoqiang), Propaganda (Liu Yunshan) and United Front (Wang Zhaoguo). Moreover, Organization (He Guoqiang) and Propaganda (Liu Yunshan) departments were also represented in the Secretariat. In addition, the director of the Central Office, Wang Gang,²⁶ was also made an alternate member of the Politburo. Out of the 20 central party-institutions, nine were represented in the Politburo, even though there actually were six individuals from these institutions.

In contrast, central government-institutions including ministries and commissions under the State Council were less well represented. Out of 29 ministries and commissions, only one was represented in the Politburo and another represented in

26. He was also secretary of the Committee of Central Organs under the Central Committee.

Table 3. Central party-institution Central Committee representation (2002)

Central party institutions	cca	ccf	ccpf	ccpa	sec	Index
Organization Department	1	2	1	0	1	8
Propaganda Department	1	1	1	0	1	6
United Front Department	0	4	1	0	0	10
International Liaison Department	1	1	0	0	0	3
General Office	2	2	0	1	0	8
Party School	0	1	0	0	0	2
<i>People's Daily</i>	0	1	0	0	0	2
Party History Research Center	0	0	0	0	0	0
Party Literature	0	0	0	0	0	0
Compilation and Translation Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0
Work Committee of the Central Government	0	0	0	0	0	2
Work Committee of the Departments Under the Central Committee	0	0	0	0	0	0
Committee of Political Science and Law under the Central Committee	0	1	0	0	0	2
Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security	0	0	0	0	0	0
Policy Research Office of the Central Committee	0	2	0	0	0	4
Taiwan Office	1	1	0	0	0	3
International Communications Office	0	1	0	0	0	2
Central Foreign Affairs Office	0	1	0	0	0	2
Committee of State Secrets	0	0	0	0	0	0
Central Guard Bureau	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total	7	18	3	1	2	55

Notes: ccf = full members of the Central Committee; cca = alternate members of the Central Committee; ccpf = full members of the Politburo; ccps = standing members of the Politburo; sec = members of the Secretariat. Sources: Shen Xueming and Zheng Jianying, eds, *Zhonggong Diyijie zhi Dishiwujie Zhongyangweiyuan [The Central Committee Members of the Chinese Communist Party from the First through the Fifteenth Central Committee]* (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian chubanshe, 2001); *People's Daily* online.

the Secretariat. Zeng Peiyan, chairman of the State Development Planning Commission, was elevated to the Politburo. He Yong, minister of Supervision, was inducted into the Secretariat. If we look at these 29 ministries and commissions alone, there were only 30 full members and 11 alternate members. The number of full members in the central government-institutions was less than half of that (67) in the provinces; the number of alternate members in the central government-institutions was even less, only 13% of that (87) in the provinces.

There are additional central government-institutions under the State Council. These are 17 organizations, 7 working organs, 13 institutions, and 15 bureaus. Including ministries and commissions, there are altogether 81 institutions under the State Council.²⁷ The total numbers of full and alternate members from these

27. For an introduction to the historical evolution of institutional reforms at the central level from 1982 to 2001, see Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, 'Institutional reform and the *Bianzhi* system in China', *The China Quarterly* 170, (June 2002), pp. 361–386.

institutions in addition to a few offices of the State Council such as the Office of Secretaries-General, the Working Committee of State Enterprises, and industrial bureaus under the State Council were 51 and 18, respectively. These were still significantly less than the numbers in provinces. Compared to provinces, the representation of the central government-institutions in the CC was only 76% in terms of full members and 21% in terms of alternate members.

There are additional central institutions that do not necessarily belong to either central party or central government institutions. The Supreme People's Court and The Supreme People's Procurate, for instance, are judicial institutions. Five major banks in China (China Industrial and Commercial Bank, China Agricultural Bank, China Development Bank, China Construction Bank, and the Bank of China) obviously belong to banking institutions. Moreover, there are 14 mass organizations such as All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Communist Youth League of China, All-China Women's Federation and so on. In one rare case, a central cadre belongs to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Li Guixian, a technocrat with extensive experience at both provincial and central levels, was retained as a full member of the 16th CC.

Even if we put all these other institutions under central government-institutions, the total numbers of full (58) and alternate members (25) were still less than those from provinces (Table 4). In terms of the total power index, the provinces still beat central government-institutions by a huge margin of 100 points. The score of provincial power index was 246, and the score of all these central government-institutions was only 144. The provinces were much more powerful than central government-institutions. Even if we combine the power index of the central party-institutions with that of the central government-institutions, the central institutions as a whole were less powerful than the provinces. The score of the combined index was 197, still about 50 points less than that of the provincial power index.

2.3. Military representation

With the exception of Jiang Zemin, the military representation in the Politburo remained more or less the same in 2002 as five years ago. No one had a seat on the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and there were two Politburo members and one Secretariat member from the military. The only difference is that the military representative in the 16th Secretariat was not a concurrent Politburo member as before. In 1997, Zhang Wannian served in both the Politburo and the Secretariat. In 2002, neither Guo Boxiong nor Cao Gangchuan was in the Secretariat. Xu Caihou, a member of the CMC, made it to the Secretariat instead. A native of Liaoning, Xu joined the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1963. Twenty years later, in 1983, he became a deputy-director of the Political Department in the Jilin Provincial Military District. After serving in various capacities in the 16th Group Army of the Ground Force, he was selected in 1992 to be assistant director of the General Political Department under Yu Yongbo, a CMC member. In 1999, he was inducted to the CMC and was re-elected to that key organ in 2002.

Table 4. Central government Central Committee representation (2002)

Central government institutions	cca	ccf	ccpf	sec	Index
Foreign Affairs	1	2	0	0	5
National Defense	0	0	0	0	0
State Development Planning Commission	1	1	1	0	5
State Economic & Trade Commission	1	1	0	0	3
Education	3	1	0	0	5
Science and Technology	0	1	0	0	2
Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense	2	0	0	0	2
State Ethnic Affairs Commission	0	1	0	0	2
Public Security	1	2	0	0	5
State Security	0	1	0	0	2
Supervision	0	2	0	1	5
Civil Affairs	0	1	0	0	2
Justice	0	1	0	0	2
Finance	0	1	0	0	2
Personnel	0	1	0	0	2
Labor and Social Security	0	1	0	0	2
Land and Resources	0	1	0	0	2
Construction	0	1	0	0	2
Railways	0	1	0	0	2
Communications	0	1	0	0	2
Information Industry	0	0	0	0	0
Water Resources	0	1	0	0	2
Agriculture	1	1	0	0	3
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation	0	1	0	0	2
Culture	0	1	0	0	2
Health	1	1	0	0	3
State Family Planning Commission	0	1	0	0	2
People's Bank of China	0	2	0	0	4
National Audit Office	0	1	0	0	2
General Administration of Customs	0	1	0	0	2
State Administration of Taxation	0	1	0	0	2
General Administration for Industry and Commerce	0	1	0	0	2
State General Administration of the People's Republic of China for Quality Supervision & Inspection & Quarantine	0	1	0	0	2
State Environmental Protection Administration	0	1	0	0	2
General Administration of the Civil Aviation of China	0	1	0	0	2
State Administration of Radio, Film and Television	0	1	0	0	2
General Administration of Press and Publication	0	1	0	0	2
State General Administration of Sports	1	1	0	0	3
National Bureau of Statistics	1	0	0	0	1
State Forestry Bureau	1	0	0	0	1
State Drug Administration	0	0	0	0	0
State Intellectual Property Office	0	0	0	0	0
National Tourism Administration	0	0	0	0	0
State Administration of Religious Affairs	1	0	0	0	1
Counselor's Office of the State Council	0	0	0	0	0
Government Offices Administration of the State Council	0	0	0	0	0
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council	0	0	0	0	0
Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council	0	1	0	0	2
Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council	0	0	0	0	0

Central government institutions	cca	ccf	ccpf	sec	Index
Economic Restructuring Office of the State Council	0	1	0	0	2
Research Office of the State Council	0	1	0	0	2
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council	0	0	0	0	0
Information Office of the State Council	0	0	0	0	0
Xinhua News Agency	0	1	0	0	2
Chinese Academy of Sciences	1	1	0	0	3
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	1	0	0	0	1
Chinese Academy of Engineering	0	1	0	0	2
Development Research Center of the State Council	0	0	0	0	0
National School of Administration	0	1	0	0	2
China Seismological Bureau	0	0	0	0	0
China Meteorological Administration	0	0	0	0	0
China Securities Regulatory Commission	0	1	0	0	2
China Insurance Regulatory Commission	1	0	0	0	1
National Electricity Regulatory Commission	0	1	0	0	2
National Council for Social Security Fund	0	0	0	0	0
National Natural Science Foundation of China	0	0	0	0	0
Industrial Bureaus	0	1	0	0	2
State Council Office	0	2	0	0	4
Courts	2	1	0	0	4
Banks	4	0	0	0	4
Mass Organizations	1	5	0	0	11
CPPCC	0	1	0	0	2
Total	25	58	1	1	144

Notes: ccf = full members of the Central Committee; cca = alternate members of the Central Committee; ccpf = full members of the Politburo; ccps = standing members of the Politburo; sec = members of the Secretariat. Sources: Shen Xueming and Zheng Jianying, eds, *Zhonggong Diyijie zhi Dishiwujie Zhongyangweiyuan [The Central Committee Members of the Chinese Communist Party from the First through the Fifteenth Central Committee]* (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian chubanshe, 2001); *People's Daily* online.

As the most senior member of the current CMC and director of the General Political Department, Xu could play an important role in the Secretariat as the only military representative.

This CMC is smaller than its predecessor, with only four members. These members are in charge of four general departments. Xu Caihou is director of the General Political Department; Liang Guanglie is chief of the General Staff; Liao Xilong is director of the General Logistics Department; and Li Jinai is director of the General Armament Department. In addition to these general departments, there are four central military command institutions as well as three military academic institutions in the Center. The central military command institutions include navy, air force, the second artillery force, and armed police force. The military academic institutions include the University of National Defense, the Academy of Military Sciences, and the National University of Defense Technology. In the locality, there are seven military regions: Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. Each of these regions is in charge of several provincial military districts. All these military institutions were represented in the Central Committee. There are two more cases where the institutional identity was not

Table 5. Military Central Committee representation (2002)

Military institutions	cca	ccf	ccpf	sec	cmc	Index
General Staff	3	3	0	0	1	10
Political Department	2	2	0	1	1	8
Logistics Department	1	3	0	0	1	8
Armament Department	1	2	0	0	1	6
Navy	1	3	0	0	0	7
Air Force	0	2	0	0	0	4
Second Artillery Force	0	2	0	0	0	4
Chinese People's Armed Police Force	1	3	0	0	0	7
Shenyang Military Area Command	2	4	0	0	0	10
Beijing Military Area Command	2	2	0	0	0	6
Lanzhou Military Area Command	1	3	0	0	0	7
Jinan Military Area Command	2	1	0	0	0	4
Jinan Military Area Command	1	3	0	0	0	7
Guangzhou Military Area Command	1	3	0	0	0	7
Chengdu Military Area Command	1	2	0	0	0	5
University of National Defense	1	1	0	0	0	3
Military Academy of Sciences	0	1	0	0	0	2
National University of Defence Technology	1	1	0	0	0	3
Unknown	2	0	0	0	0	2
Total	23	41	0	1	4	110

Notes: ccf = full members of the Central Committee; cca = alternate members of the Central Committee; ccpf = full members of the Politburo; ccps = standing members of the Politburo; sec = members of the Secretariat. Sources: Shen Xueming and Zheng Jianying, eds, *Zhonggong Diyijie zhi Dishiwujie Zhongyangweiyuan [The Central Committee Members of the Chinese Communist Party from the First through the Fifteenth Central Committee]* (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian chubanshe, 2001); *People's Daily* online.

known. Liu Yuejun, former commander of the Macao Garrison of the PLA, was made an alternate member of the 16th CC. He was promoted to a new post in March 2002, but the name of the new post was not revealed. Zhang Xiaozhong, another completely new alternate member, seems to be working for the PLA, but his institutional identity is not clear either.²⁸

Compared with the key central government institutions (29 ministries and commissions), the military is better represented in the Central Committee. There are 41 full members and 23 alternate members in the Central Committee from the military, 11 more in the category of full and 12 more in the category of alternate members than those from the key central government institutions. Since there are only 18 military institutions, the Central Committee representation per institution is even better in the military than in the central government institutions. The full-member representation from the military was 2.16 on average, while the average from central government institutions was only 1.03. A similar pattern can

28. He (or someone else with the exact same name) has written a number of articles regarding nuclear programs in the United States, India, France, and other countries.

be found at the alternate level as well. The average military representation was 1.21, while the average central government institution representation was only 0.38.

If we compare scores of the power index across military institutions, we may find that the General Staff and the Shenyang Military Region were the most powerful ones (Table 5). With a total score of ten points each, these institutions were best represented in the 16th CC. The General Political Department (eight), and the General Logistics Department (eight) followed. On the other hand, several military institutions were not very well represented. The Air Force, the Second Artillery Force, and the Jinan Military Region each had only four points.

The total power index for the military is 110 points, less than either the provinces or the central institutions.

2.4. Corporate representation

There had been corporate representation in the Central Committee in the past, but economic enterprises have seldom been treated as a group in Chinese politics. Corporate leaders became much more visible in politics as a result of the 16th Party Congress. There were 18 corporate leaders²⁹ in the 16th CC: 2 full members and 16 alternates. One full member, Li Yizhong, chairman of the Board and president of the Sinopec Corp., was promoted from an alternate member. The other, Zhang Qingwei, president of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, was plucked from a non-Central Committee member and made a full member because of his enormous contributions to the successful launchings of satellites for Chinese clients as well as for foreign ones. Among the 16 alternate members, three had been on the 15th CC. Tao Jianxing (CEO of the Chunlan Corporation in Jiangsu), Liu Jie (chairman of the Board of the Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation in Liaoning), and Xie Qihua (president of the Baoshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation in Shanghai) were re-elected into the 16th CC as alternate members. The Capital Iron and Steel Group Corporation, a flagship in economic reforms during the 1980s and 1990s, however, was ostensibly absent from the list. Other interesting cases include Su Shulin, chairman and general manager of Daqing Oilfield Company, Zhu Yanfeng, president of China Faw Group Corp., Ma Fucui, president of China Petroleum and National Gas Corporation, Zhang Ruimin, CEO of the Haier Group Corporation, Li Changyin, general manager of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, and Wang Mingquan, chairman of China Everbright (Group) Limited. Out of 87 business leaders (excluding 17 bankers) identified by China-vips.com,³⁰ however, only five made it to the list.

Clearly, the corporate leaders have yet to form an important political force in China. The total power index for the group was only 20 points, much less than those of any other political institution.

29. I have also included Tie Ning, a writer, in this category.

30. <http://www.china-vips.com/vips/pico2.htm>, accessed on 10 March 2003.

3. Factional groups in the 16th Central Committee

Chinese politics has long been perceived as politics of political factions.³¹ Nevertheless, few have fully examined some fundamental assumptions of factional politics. For instance, there is no study of the group cohesion of the factional groups. It is not clear whether all these factional groups have similar internal structures and whether some factional groups are more cohesive than others. Moreover, several factional groups have been treated as if they belonged to mutually exclusive factions, yet no one has systematically presented evidence for the argument. In fact, there could be overlaps between these groups. Being a member of the Shanghai Gang, for instance, does not necessarily prevent one from being a member of the Qinghua Clique. And being a member of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group is not necessarily incompatible with being a member of the Princelings (*taizi dang*).

The political entities that this section attempts to analyze are not factions but factional groups. A faction, according to Andrew Nathan, is a structure that is ‘mobilized on the basis of clientelist ties to engage in politics and consisting of a few, rather than a great many, layers of personnel’.³² A clientelist tie is ‘a non-ascriptive two-person relationship founded on exchange, in which well-understood rights and obligations are established between the two parties’.³³ According to Nathan, there are three possible structures of factions: simple factions, complex factions, and simple factions with support structures³⁴ and the key feature of all these structures is ‘the one-to-one, rather than corporate, pattern of relationships between leaders (or subleaders) and followers’.³⁵

Factional groups, on the other hand, are based on corporate ties, ties that have been established through shared experience in an organization. In a factional group, in contrast to a faction, there may not necessarily be a clearly identifiable leader. Members of a factional group, however, have to have direct association based on their past experience. Not all factional groups are factions, although it is likely that some subsets of a factional group may form a faction.

The four factional groups identified in this section do not all neatly fit the definition of a factional group. The Shanghai Gang comes closest to the definition of a faction instead of a factional group because it has a leader, Jiang Zemin, and is based on a patron–client relationship between Jiang and his followers. The CCYL Group, on the other hand, comes closest to the definition of a factional group because it does not have a single leader but its members share experience in the same organization (the Central Committee of the CCYL). The Qinghua Clique is similar to the CCYL Group because it does not have an identifiable leader but

31. For a systematic discussion of factional politics in China, see Jonathan Unger, ed., *The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002). For a recent study of the Qinghua Clique and the Princelings, see Cheng Li, *China's Leaders: The New Generation* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001), pp. 87–174.

32. Andrew J. Nathan, ‘A factionalism model for CCP politics’, *The China Quarterly* 53, (January–March 1973), pp. 34–66.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 41, Figure 1.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 42–43.

its members have the same experience with the same institution of higher education (Qinghua University). The Princelings is different from all of the above because it is more of a categorical group than a factional group based on the same corporate experience.

3.1. *Shanghai Gang*

The Shanghai Gang refers to politicians who have used Shanghai as a springboard to launch their political careers. The members of the Shanghai Gang are not necessarily Shanghai natives. In fact, as my recent study indicates, none of the Shanghai Gang members who were working in the Center in the 1990s were born in Shanghai.³⁶ Shanghai has been very prominent in Chinese politics since 1949. In the past 50 or so years, the Shanghai Gang has experienced three rises. Before the Cultural Revolution one may find Chen Yi and Ke Qingshi among the members of the Politburo. During the Cultural Revolution, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen (three of the Gang of Four) were standing members of the Politburo. In the past 13 years since Jiang Zemin was selected as general secretary of the Party in 1989, the Shanghai Gang re-emerged in Chinese politics.

A member of the Shanghai Gang in this study refers to someone who has worked or is currently working in Shanghai. According to this criterion, 18 people could be identified as members of the Shanghai Gang in the 16th CC: 14 full members and four alternate members (Table 6). Three Shanghai Gang members were part of the core of the Chinese political system: Wu Bangguo, Zeng Qinghong and Huang Ju. They were all standing members of the Politburo. Five were stationed in Shanghai: Chen Liangyu (Politburo member and party secretary and mayor), Han Zheng (deputy secretary and executive vice mayor),³⁷ Yin Yicui (standing member and director of the Propaganda Department of the Shanghai Party Committee), Xie Qihua (president of the Baoshan Iron and Steel Group Corp.), and Wu Qidi (president of Tongji University).³⁸ One was party secretary of Jiangxi (Meng Jianzhu). Five were in charge of ministries: Chen Zhili (Education),³⁹ Zhang Wenkang (Health),⁴⁰ Dai Xianglong (People's Bank of China),⁴¹ Xu Guangchun (National General Bureau of Radio, Movie, and Television), and Xu Kuangdi (Chinese Academy of Engineering). Four were holding positions in the Party: Zhao Qizheng (Information Office), Wang Huning (Policy Research Office), Hua Jianmin (Finance Office),⁴² and You Xigui (Central Guard Bureau).

Noticeably, Shanghai Gang members were not particularly popular among party deputies to the Congress. The four alternate members from Shanghai were not very high on the list of alternates starting with those who received the most votes.

36. Zhiyue Bo, 'The provinces: training ground for national leaders or a power in their own right?' in David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan, eds, *China's Leadership in the Twenty-first Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 66–117.

37. He is mayor now.

38. She was recently appointed as vice-minister of Education.

39. She is a state councilor now.

40. He was fired in April 2003 because of his mishandling of the SARS crisis in China.

41. He was transferred to Tianjin as acting mayor.

42. He is secretary-general of the State Council now.

Table 6. Members of the Shanghai Gang in the 16th Central Committee (2002)

Name	Birth	Home	CC membership	Rank	Work place	Index
Chen Liangyu	1946	Zhejiang	Full	n/a	Shanghai	4
Chen Zhili (f.)	1942	Fujian	Full	n/a	Education	2
Dai Xianglong	1944	Jiangsu	Full	n/a	People's Bank of China	2
Han Zheng	1954	Zhejiang	Full	n/a	Shanghai	2
Hua Jianmin	1940	Jiangsu	Full	n/a	Finance Office	2
Huang Ju	1938	Zhejiang	Full	n/a	Politburo	5
Meng Jianzhu	1947	Jiangsu	Full	n/a	Jiangxi	2
Wang Huning	1955	Shangdon	Full	n/a	Policy	2
Wu Bangguo	1941	Anhui	Full	n/a	Politburo	5
Wu Qidi (f.)	1947	Zhejiang	Alternate	73	Shanghai	1
Xie Qihua (f.)	1943	Zhejiang	Alternate	80	Baosteel	1
Xu Guangchun	1944	Zhejiang	Full	n/a	Radio, Movie, and TV	2
Xu Kuangdi	1937	Zhejiang	Full	n/a	Academy of Engineering	2
Yin Yicui (f.)	1955	Zhejiang	Alternate	140	Shanghai	1
You Xigui	1939	Hebei	Alternate	158	Central Guard	1
Zeng Qinghong	1939	Jiangxi	Full	n/a	Politburo	6
Zhang Wenkang	1940	Shanghai	Full	n/a	Health	2
Zhao Qizheng	1940	Beijing	Full	n/a	Information	2
Total						44

Sources: Shen Xueming and Zheng Jianying, eds, *Zhonggong Diyijie zhi Dishiwujie Zhongyanguangweiyuan* [The Central Committee Members of the Chinese Communist Party from the First through the Fifteenth Central Committee] (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian chubanshe, 2001); *People's Daily* online.

Among 158 alternate members, the four Shanghai Gang members ranked 73rd, 80th, 140th and 158th. You Xigui, Jiang Zemin's personal bodyguard, received the least number of votes as an alternate member and was the last on the list.

The Shanghai Gang seems to be at its peak in terms of power. The total score of power indexes of the Shanghai Gang members in the 16th CC is 44 points. It scored another major victory in March 2003 when the new national government was reconstituted. Jiang Zemin was re-elected as chairman of the Central Military Commission of the PRC for a third term. Wu Bangguo was elected chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Zeng Qinghong was made vice president of the PRC. Huang Ju was made vice premier. Hua Jianmin and Chen Zhili were made state councilors.⁴³ Hua was also concurrent secretary-general of the State Council. However, the Shanghai Gang as a faction is also faced with a serious crisis. With Jiang's departure as general secretary and president, the Shanghai Gang is likely to be fragmented. Although there are three possible candidates, none of them is able to inherit the mantle of the core of the Shanghai Gang. No. 2 person in the Standing Committee of the Politburo and chairman of

43. The Shanghai Gang members including their leader were quite unpopular among NPC deputies. They received the lowest votes in the election. Jiang failed to get about 220 votes (7.5%); Zeng failed to get 367 votes (12.5%); Huang got the lowest votes among four vice premiers; and Chen received the lowest votes among five state councilors. For details, see Willy Lam, 'National People's Congress: popularity and power', *China Brief* 3(6), (25 March 2003). http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/cwe_003_006_001.htm, accessed on 5 May 2003.

the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Wu Bangguo, is well qualified for being the next core of the Shanghai Gang. But Zeng Qinghong, no. 5 person in the Standing Committee of the Politburo, vice president of the PRC, the most senior member of the Secretariat, and president of the Central Party School, could also claim the inheritance. Yet Zeng is inherently deficient because of his short stint in Shanghai. He was transferred to Shanghai in 1984 as a deputy director of the Organization Department of the Shanghai Party Committee and was a deputy secretary between 1986 and 1989 before he followed Jiang Zemin to Beijing. In contrast, Huang Ju, no. 6 person in the Standing Committee and vice-premier, has much deeper roots in Shanghai. He joined the work force in Shanghai after graduation from Qinghua University in 1963. He became a standing member of the Shanghai Party Committee in 1983, a deputy secretary in 1985, mayor in 1991, and party secretary in 1994. He worked in Shanghai for 40 years, including 20 years as a municipal leader. Although the three would continue to pay some respect to Jiang Zemin, none of them would get along with others in a superior-subordinate relationship. Clearly, the Shanghai Gang as a faction does not have a bright future because it simply cannot afford to have three cores at the same time with a small and dwindling number of followers. No faction, as Andrew Nathan observed three decades ago, can survive its leader because of its unique patron-client ties between the leader and the followers.⁴⁴

In order to compare factional groups, we are going to construct a group cohesion index for inner-circle members of the Shanghai Gang. Inner-circle members are those who have worked in Shanghai as municipal leaders either in the Party committee or in the government. In the 16th CC, seven people can be identified as inner-circle members of the Shanghai Gang from the Shanghai Party Committee. They are Wu Bangguo, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Chen Zhili, Xu Kuangdi, Chen Liangyu and Han Zheng. We first calculated their ties in terms of the number of years they worked together in the Shanghai Party Committee for each pair and then added them together to get the group cohesion index.⁴⁵ The group cohesion index for Shanghai party leaders amounts to 63.5 years. Since there are 21 pairs of relationships, the average tie is about three years.

We have also calculated a group cohesion index for the inner-circle members of the Shanghai Gang from the Shanghai Municipal Government. Again, seven people were identified and their ties were added. The seven people were Huang Ju, Xu Kuangdi, Zhao Qizheng, Meng Jianzhu, Hua Jianmin, Chen Liangyu and Han Zheng. The group cohesion index is 39.67 years. Clearly, Shanghai government

44. Nathan, 'A factionalism model for CCP politics', p. 43. For this reason, Zeng Qinghong is not waiting to inherit the Shanghai Gang as it was but developing his own faction. Although some members of a Zeng faction may have come from the original Shanghai Gang under Jiang, the Zeng faction is going to be a new one.

45. This index, admittedly, is not a perfect measure of group cohesion because working together at the same time in the same organization is not the same as working together cooperatively. In fact, one sometimes finds that the longer a pair work together, the more likely it is that they hate each other. This is particularly true between party secretaries and governors (mayors) of the same provincial unit. The index, however, serves two useful functions. At the individual level, it provides a rough measure of a person's depth (the number of years of service in the organization) and breadth (the numbers of colleagues in close contact in the organization) of connections in the organization. At the group level, it provides a rough measure of tightness of the group (or group cohesion). This index makes inter-group comparison possible, as long as the intra-organizational problems mentioned above exist in all organizations.

leaders were not as close as their counterparts in the Shanghai Party Committee because the average tie is only 1.9 years.

We may be able to get an estimate of the group cohesion of the Shanghai Gang by adding these two indexes. The result is 103.17 years. In other words, the inner circle members of the Shanghai Gang worked with one another for over 100 years.

Individually, Huang Ju is the most entrenched of the Shanghai party leaders with ties of 38 years. Chen Liangyu ranks the second with ties of 24.5 years. Han Zheng, on the other hand, is the least entrenched with a tie of only 0.5 years with only another member of the Shanghai Gang. Zeng Qinghong is the second least entrenched with ties of six years. Among the Shanghai government leaders, however, Xu Kuangdi is the most entrenched with ties of 22 years. Zhao Qizheng and Chen Liangyu rank the second and the third with ties of 13.5 and 11.5 years, respectively. Hua Jianmin, on the other hand, is the least entrenched with ties of 6.17 years.

With the combined ties of 44.67 years with nine other Shanghai leaders, Huang Ju stands out as the most entrenched member of the Shanghai Gang among the 16th CC members. Xu Kuangdi ranks the second with combined ties of 40 years with nine other Shanghai leaders.⁴⁶ Zeng Qinghong, the pivotal member of the old Shanghai Gang with Jiang Zemin at the core, on the other hand, has the least ties with other Shanghai leaders. His combined ties are only six years, and he worked with only two other Shanghai leaders in the 16th CC.

3.2. *Princelings*

Princelings refer to children of former high-ranking officials of the CCP. Since they have been treated as an important political faction in the literature of Chinese politics, it is important to analyze them here although some of them do not really know each other personally. Fifteen people in the 16th CC are children of former high-ranking officials: 12 full and three alternate members (Table 7). Evidently, these Princelings were not particularly popular either. The three alternate members, for instance, were close to the last on the list. Deng Pufang, son of Deng Xiaoping, who had been second from the last as an alternate member in the 15th CC, ranked number 154 out of 158 alternates in the 16th CC. Chen Yuan, son of Chen Yun, barely made it to the list as an alternate in the 16th CC and ranked number 153, immediately ahead of Deng Pufang. Wang Luolin, son of Wang Ya'nan, was even worse. He was demoted from a full-member in the 15th CC to an alternate-member in the 16th CC, one of only two cases,⁴⁷ and he was second to the last on the list.

Four provincial leaders who are children of former high-ranking officials, however, seemed to be doing much better in 2002 than five years earlier. Bo Xilai, son of Bo Yibo, was made a full-member on the 16th CC, even though he had

46. Xu Kuangdi indeed was 'dislodged' in December 2001 (about one year earlier than his scheduled retirement in early 2003). However, he has been handsomely rewarded for his service in Shanghai. He not only retained his seat on the 16th Central Committee as one of the oldest members but also obtained a post of vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC.

47. The other person is Zhang Wenyue, a deputy secretary of Liaoning.

Table 7. Princelings in the 16th Central Committee (2002)

Name	Home	Birth	Rank	CC membership	Index
Bo Xilai	Shanxi	1949	n/a	Full	2
Chen Yuan	Shanghai	1945	153	Alternate	1
Dai Bingguo (Tujia)	Guizhou	1941	n/a	Full	2
Deng Pufang	Sichuan	1944	154	Alternate	1
Hong Hu	Anhui	1940	n/a	Full	2
Li Tielin	Hunan	1943	n/a	Full	2
Liao Hui	Guangdong	1942	n/a	Full	2
Liu Yandong (f.)	Jiangsu	1945	n/a	Full	2
Luo Gan	Shangdong	1935	n/a	Full	5
Wang Luolin	Hubei	1938	157	Alternate	1
Wang Qishan	Shanxi	1948	n/a	Full	2
Xi Jinping	Shaanxi	1953	n/a	Full	2
Yu Zhengsheng	Zhejiang	1945	n/a	Full	4
Zeng Qinghong	Jiangxi	1939	n/a	Full	6
Zhou Xiaochuan		1948	n/a	Full	2
Total					36

Sources: Shen Xueming and Zheng Jianying, eds, *Zhonggong Diyijie zhi Dishiwujie Zhongyangweiyuan* [The Central Committee Members of the Chinese Communist Party from the First through the Fifteenth Central Committee] (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian chubanshe, 2001); *People's Daily* online.

failed to enter the 15th CC as an alternate-member. Xi Jinping, son of Xi Zhongxun, was promoted to a full-member this time, even though he had been the last as an alternate-member on the 15th CC. Hong Hu, son of Hong Xuezhi, stayed on as a full-member. Yu Zhengsheng, son of Huang Jing, made it to the Politburo.

Two Princelings are part of the core of the central leadership. Zeng Qinghong and Luo Gan are both standing members of the Politburo. Six other Princelings all occupied important positions in the Party or the government. Liu Yandong was executive deputy director of the United Front Department and now is director of the Department. Dai Bingguo, son of Huang Zhen, was director of the International Liaison Department.⁴⁸ Li Tielin, son of Li Weihai, was deputy director of the Organization Department. Liao Hui, son of Liao Chengzhi, was director of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office under the State Council. Wang Qishan, son-in-law of Yao Yilin, was director of the Economic Restructuring Office under the State Council and was transferred to Hainan as party secretary in December 2002. He is now acting mayor of Beijing after Meng Xuenong was fired due to the SARS epidemic in Beijing. Finally, Zhou Xiaochuan, son of Zhou Jiannan, was chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission and now is governor of the People's Bank of China. The combined power index of these Princelings is 36 points, a few points less than those of the Shanghai Gang.

That these people belong to the same category does not mean that they necessarily form a coherent faction. With very few exceptions, it is hard to find

48. He is vice minister of Foreign Affairs now.

evidence that any of them has ever worked with any other in the same organization. The obvious exception is Luo Gan and Zeng Qinghong, who had worked together in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP for five years. They were both elected members of the Secretariat in 1997 and worked in that organ for the next five years. Another pair that worked for a short period of time is Yu Zhengsheng and Deng Pufang. Yu, a Politburo member and party secretary of Hubei, joined Deng between September 1984 and November 1985 in the China Handicap Foundation as vice chairman of the Board. A third pair is Zeng Qinghong and Li Tielin. Li has been a deputy-director of the Central Organization Department since 1992. Zeng was the director of the Central Organization Department between 1999 and 2002. They worked together for three years.

It is likely that some of these people have closer personal ties with one another. Chen Yuan and Deng Pufang must know each other personally. Only one year apart, the two were likely playmates when they were young. They went to different universities later on, however. Deng was enrolled in the Department of Physics at Beijing University, and Chen went to Qinghua University to study automatic control. Another pair is Wang Qishan and Zhou Xiaochuan. Although they did not work in the same organization at the same time, they worked in the same organizations consecutively. Wang was vice governor of the China Construction Bank between 1989 and 1993, while Zhou was vice governor of the Bank of China between 1991 and 1995. Wang became vice governor of the People's Bank of China in 1993 and Zhou assumed the same position in 1996. Wang was governor of the China Construction Bank from 1994 to 1997, and Zhou was in the same post from 1998 to 2000. To this pair, one may add Chen Yuan, another banker. There is no evidence that Chen has worked with either of them in the same organization, but interactions with both of them were inevitable.

Clearly, it is tempting to describe the Princlings as a political faction, but no hard evidence is available for such an argument. Although the power index of these Princlings is only a few points less than that of the Shanghai Gang, their group cohesion index (nine years) is much less than that of the Shanghai Gang (103.17 years). Moreover, although Zeng Qinghong is best connected among the Princlings, he is far from being the core of the Princlings as a group. He has worked with only two other Princlings.

3.3. *Qinghua Clique*

Although historically there may have been a Qinghua Clique under the leadership of Jiang Nanxiang, it is not clear whether such a clique has existed in the past decade.⁴⁹ Since school ties are useful resources in politics, political leaders who share an experience with the same institute of higher education may choose to activate their school identities for political purposes. For this reason, this study treats graduates of the Qinghua University as a factional group.

There are 20 graduates of Qinghua University in the 16th CC: 16 full and four alternate members (Table 8). Among nine standing members of the Politburo, four

49. For a detailed study of the evolution of the Qinghua Clique, see Li, *China's Leaders*, ch. 4.

Table 8. Qinghua graduates in the 16th Central Committee (2002)

Name	Home	Birth	Major	Department	Entry	Party	Graduation	Index
Chen Yuan	Shanghai	1945	Automatic control	Automatic control	1964	1975	1970	1
Hu Jintao	Anhui	1942	Hydropower	Water conservancy	1959	1964	1965	9
Hua Jianmin	Jiangsu	1940	Gas turbine	Power	1957	1961	1963	2
Huang Ju	Zhejiang	1938	Electrical machinery	Electrical machinery	1956	1966	1963	5
Jia Chunwang	Beijing	1938	Engineering physics	Engineering physics	1957	1962	1964	2
Li Tielin	Hunan	1943	Automatic control	Automatic control	1962	1980	1968	2
Liu Yandong (f.)	Jiangsu	1945	Chemical engineering	Chemical engineering	1964	1964	1970	2
Tian Chengping	Hebei	1945	Civil architecture	Civil architecture	1962	1964	1968	2
Wang Shucheng	Jiangsu	1941	Water conservancy	Water conservancy	1959	1965	1968	2
Wu Bangguo	Anhui	1941	Electron tube	Radio electronics	1960	1964	1967	5
Wu Guanzheng	Jiangxi	1938	Thermal measurement	Power	1959	1962	1968	5
Wu Qidi (f.)	Zhejiang	1947	Radio	Radio electronics	1964	1974	1970	1
Xi Jinping	Shaanxi	1953	Chemical engineering	Chemical engineering	1974	1974	1979	2
Xie Qihua (f.)	Zhejiang	1943	Unknown	Engineering	1962	1980	1968	1
Xie Zhenhua	Tianjin	1949	Engineering physics	Engineering physics	1973	1969	1977	2
Xu Rongkai	Chongqing	1942	Mechanics	Mechanics	1961	1960	1966	2
Zeng Peiyan	Zhejiang	1938	Electronics	Radio electronics	1956	1978	1962	4
Zhang Delin	Beijing	1939	Mechanics	Mechanics	1958	1964	1964	2
Zhang Fusen	Beijing	1940	Automatic control	Automatic control	1959	1958	1965	2
Zhang Huazhu	Jiangsu	1945	Automatic control	Automatic control	1963	1965	1970	1
Total								54

Sources: Shen Xueming and Zheng Jianying, eds, *Zhonggong Diyijie zhi Dishiwujie Zhongyangweiyuan [The Central Committee Members of the Chinese Communist Party from the First through the Fifteenth Central Committee]* (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian chubanshe, 2001); *People's Daily* online.

are Qinghua graduates: Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Huang Ju and Wu Guanzheng. Another Politburo member, Zeng Peiyan, is also a Qinghua graduate. Other Qinghua graduates include ten central leaders (Li Tielin, Zhang Fusen, Chen Yuan, Zhang Huazhu, Wang Shucheng, Zhang Delin, Xie Zhenhua, Jia Chunwang, Hua Jianmin and Liu Yandong), three provincial leaders (Tian Chengping, Xi Jinping and Xu Rongkai), one business leader (Xie Qihua), and one academic leader (Wu Qidi). The combined power index for these leaders is 54 points, more than that of either the Princelings or the Shanghai Gang.

To estimate the group cohesion of the Qinghua Clique, we need to calculate school ties. Since it is more likely for a pair to have ties with each other if they studied in the same department than if they studied in different departments, we will count a school tie more if a pair studied in the same department at the same time than if the pair studied in different departments at the same time. Since being in the same department does not mean being together all the time unless a pair was in the same class, each year is counted as one point if a pair was in the same class, half a point if a pair was in the same department, and a quarter of a point if a pair was in different departments. According to this scheme, the group cohesion of the Qinghua Clique is much stronger than that of any previous faction. It is stronger than the group cohesion of the Shanghai Gang.⁵⁰ It is more than fifteen times as strong as the group cohesion of the Princelings.

Xi Jinping and Xie Zhenhua, it should be noted, were outliers among the Qinghua graduates because they went to Qinghua during the Cultural Revolution. No other Qinghua graduates in the 16th CC shared their educational experience at Qinghua. They studied in different departments at Qinghua in the 1970s as 'worker-peasant-soldier' students. Their overlap is three years, with a potential of forming a school tie at 0.75 points. On the other hand, Wang Shucheng's total points of school ties amount to 24.5, the highest among the Qinghua graduates. Wu Guanzheng ranks second with 23.25 points. Wu Bangguo and Hu Jintao rank third and fourth with 19.75 points and 17 points, respectively. It is difficult to identify a core among the Qinghua graduates. It is tempting to say that Hu Jintao should be the core, but it is not easy to find hard evidence. It is also difficult to imagine Wang Shucheng as the core of the Qinghua Clique simply because he had the highest score on school ties. From this perspective, the Qinghua Clique may not be as coherent and tight a political faction as it appears to be.⁵¹

3.4. Chinese Communist Youth League Group

The Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) cadres have long been visible in the Party Center. Hu Yaobang was the first among CCYL cadres to have assumed the topmost position in the Party. A long-marcher who had been the first secretary

50. The two indexes, it should be noted, are not strictly comparable because the group cohesion index of the Qinghua graduates is based on all Qinghua graduates in the 16th CC but the group cohesion index of the Shanghai Gang is based only on members of inner circles of the party and government leaders of the Shanghai Gang in the 16th CC. The comparison, therefore, can only serve as a guide.

51. For a different assessment, see Li, *China's Leaders*, pp. 87–126.

Table 9. CCYL cadres in the 16th Central Committee (2002)

Name	Home	Birth	CC membership	Work place	Title	Index
Politburo						
Hu Jintao	Anhui	1942	Full	Politburo	General Secretary	9
Liu Yunshan	Inner Mongolia	1947	Full	Propaganda	Director	5
Wang Zhaoguo	Hebei	1941	Full	United Front	Director	4
Wang Lequan	Shandong	1944	Full	Xinjiang	Party Secretary	4
Central party institutions						
Liu Yandong (f.)	Jiangsu	1945	Full	United Front	Vice Director	2
Li Dezhu (Korean)	Jilin	1943	Full	United Front	Vice Director	2
Ji Bingxuan	Henan	1952	Alternate	Propaganda	Vice Director	1
Ling Jihua		1956	Alternate	General Office	Vice Director	1
Central government institutions						
Du Qinglin	Jilin	1946	Full	Agriculture	Minister	2
Jia Chunwang	Beijing	1938	Full	Security	Minister	2
Li Zhilun	Liaoning	1942	Full	Supervision	Vice Minister	2
Sun Jiazheng	Jiangsu	1944	Full	Culture	Minister	2
Wang Yang	Anhui	1955	Alternate	Planning	Minister	1
Ye Xiaowen	Guizhou	1950	Alternate	Religious Affairs	Director	1
Zhang Fusen	Beijing	1940	Full	Justice	Minister	2
Zhang Weiqing	Shaanxi	1944	Full	Family Planning	Minister	2
Zhang Xuezhong	Gansu	1943	Full	Personnel	Minister	2
Zhou Qiang		1961	Full	CCYL	First Secretary	2
Military						
Li Jinai	Shandong	1942	Full	Armament	Director	3
Zhang Qingli			Full	Xinjiang	Commander	2
Provincial units						
Qian Yunlu	Hubei	1944	Full	Guizhou	Party Secretary	2
Song Defu	Hebei	1946	Full	Fujian	Party Secretary	2
Ji Yunshi	Jiangsu	1945	Full	Jiangsu	Governor	2
Li Keqiang	Anhui	1955	Full	Henan	Governor	2
Ma Qizhi (Hui)	Ningxia	1943	Full	Ningxia	Governor	2

*The following became mayors (or governors) in January–February 2003.						
Han Zheng	Zhejiang	1954	Full	Shanghai	Deputy Secretary	2
Meng Xuening	Shandong	1949	Full	Beijing	Deputy Secretary	2
Huang Huahua	Guangdong	1946	Full	Guangdong	Deputy Secretary	2
Li Chengyu (Hui)	Shaanxi	1946	Alternate	Henan	Deputy Secretary	1
*The following and Li Keqiang became party secretaries in December 2002.						
Li Yuanchao	Jiangsu	1950	Alternate	Jiangsu	Deputy Secretary	1
Jiang Daming	Shandong	1953	Alternate	Shandong	Deputy Secretary	1
Liu Peng	Chongqing	1951	Alternate	Sichuan	Deputy Secretary	1
Liu Qibao	Anhui	1953	Alternate	Guangxi	Deputy Secretary	1
Luo Baoming	Tianjin	1952	Alternate	Hainan	Deputy Secretary	1
Qiang Wei	Jiangsu	1953	Alternate	Beijing	Deputy Secretary	1
Quan Zhezu (Korean)	Jilin	1952	Alternate	Jilin	Deputy Secretary	1
Shen Yueyue (f.)	Zhejiang	1957	Alternate	Anhui	Deputy Secretary	1
Song Xiuyan (f.)	Tianjin	1955	Alternate	Qinghai	Deputy Secretary	1
Sun Shuyi	Shandong	1945	Alternate	Shandong	Deputy Secretary	1
Wang Sanyun	Shandong	1952	Alternate	Sichuan	Deputy Secretary	1
Wu Aiyang (f.)	Shandong	1951	Alternate	Shandong	Deputy Secretary	1
Yang Chuantang	Shandong	1954	Alternate	Tibet	Deputy Secretary	1
Yuan Chunqing	Hunan	1952	Alternate	Shaanxi	Deputy Secretary	1
Zhang Baoshun	Hebei	1950	Alternate	Shaanxi	Deputy Secretary	1
Zhi Shuping	Tianjin	1952	Alternate	Henan	Deputy Secretary	1
Xia Baolong	Hunan	1950	Alternate	Tianjin	Vice Mayor	1
Qin Guangrong	Shandong	1949	Alternate	Yunnan	Standing Member	1
Liu Yupu			Alternate	Guangdong	Standing Member	1
San Xiangjun			Alternate	Tianjin	Standing Member	1
Shi Yuzhen (f. Miao)	Hunan	1947	Alternate	Hunan	Standing Member	1
Li Zhanshu	Hebei	1950	Alternate	Shaanxi	City Secretary	1
Li Ke (Zhuang)	Guangxi	1956	Alternate	Henan	City Secretary	1
Song Airong (f.)			Alternate	Xinjiang	Perfecture Sec.	1
Zhang Xuan (f.)	Hebei	1958	Alternate	Chongqing	District Judge	1
Total						93

Notes: Work place and title are those of November 2002. There have been a lot of changes since, some of which are indicated above. Sources: CCYL website at <http://www.ccyll.org/zuzhi/documents/> from various years; Shen Xueming and Zheng Jianying, eds, *Zhonggong Diyijie zhi Dishiwujie Zhongyangweiyuan* [*The Central Committee Members of the Chinese Communist Party from the First through the Fifteenth Central Committee*] (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian chubanshe, 2001); *People's Daily* online.

of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCYL in the 1950s, he was made general secretary of the CCP in 1980 and stayed in that position for more than six years until January 1987. However, there is no evidence that there has ever been a faction formed under his leadership; nor is there any evidence that another CCYL leader has served as the leader of a CCYL faction. In this sense, as mentioned earlier, the CCYL Group is treated as a factional group instead of a faction. Members of the CCYL Group refer to those who have been on the Central Committee of the CCYL.

The CCYL Group is the largest factional group in the 16th CC. Fifty-four people are identified as CCYL cadres: 24 full and 30 alternate members (Table 9). These cadres are not necessarily all members of a faction, but their sense of belonging to the same group has been dramatically enhanced since Hu Jintao was elected general secretary of the CCP. Hu's success highlighted the significance of their association with the CCYL. As Meng Xuenong, former mayor of Beijing, proudly remarked when he was newly elected, 'The times when we were young always stay with us with good memories. My career in the CCYL provided a foundation for my political career later on'.⁵²

In addition to Hu, there were three more Politburo members with CCYL backgrounds: Wang Zhaoguo, Liu Yunshan and Wang Lequan. There were four additional central party leaders with CCYL backgrounds (Liu Yandong, Li Dezhu, Ji Bingxuan and Ling Jihua). There were ten central government leaders: Wang Yang (vice chairman of State Development Planning Commission),⁵³ Jia Chunwang (minister of Public Security),⁵⁴ Li Zhilun (vice minister of Supervision),⁵⁵ Zhang Fusen (minister of Justice), Zhang Xuezhong (minister of Personnel),⁵⁶ Du Qinglin (minister of Agriculture), Sun Jiazheng (minister of Culture), Zhang Weiqing (chairman of State Family Planning Commission), Ye Xiaowen (director of State Religious Affairs Office), and Zhou Qiang (first secretary of the Communist Youth League of China).

The CCYL Group also scored substantial gains in the elections of new national leaders in March 2003. Hu Jintao was elected president of the PRC. Wang Zhaoguo was elected vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the 10th NPC. Liu Yandong was elected vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the 10th CPPCC.

52. Meng Xuenong, 'Gongqingtuo Shengya Weicongzheng Diandingle yige Jichu' ['My career in the CCYL has provided a foundation for my political career later on'], *People's Daily* (19 January 2003). <http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/9823/9826/20030119/910732.html>, accessed on 10 March 2003. It should be noted that his following remark was not accurate, as he further stated, 'Twenty years ago, Comrade Hu Jintao was the chief leader of the Chinese Communist Youth League. I also worked under his direct leadership. Twenty years have passed; I do not remember all the details. But I was deeply impressed by Comrade Hu Jintao. His uprightness and righteousness is the charisma of his personality. It is what all the other youth cadres should learn from him'. There are two factual errors in this statement. First, Hu was not the chief leader of the CCYL 20 years earlier. In 1982, Wang Zhaoguo was the First Secretary of the CCYL. Second, Meng did not work under the direct leadership of Hu. Hu left the CCYL in November 1985 and Meng entered the Central Committee of the CCYL in November 1985. Meng was fired on 20 April 2003 because of his mishandling of the SARS problem in Beijing.

53. He is a deputy secretary-general of the State Council now.

54. He is the president of the Supreme People's Procuratorate now.

55. He is minister of Supervision now.

56. He is party secretary of Sichuan now.

Thirty-two provincial leaders used to be CCYL cadres: eight full and 24 alternate members. These cadres were playing an increasingly important role in provincial politics as well as in national politics. They were scattered in 22 provincial units and occupied very important positions in these places. At the time when the 16th CC was elected, there were two provincial party secretaries (Song Defu and Qian Yunlu), three governors (Li Keqiang, Ji Yunshi and Ma Qizhi), 19 deputy secretaries, and one vice-mayor (Xia Baolong). Now two more party secretaries (Li Keqiang and Li Yuanchao), two more mayors (Meng Xuenong⁵⁷ of Beijing and Han Zheng of Shanghai), and two more governors (Huang Huahua of Guangdong and Li Chengyu of Henan) have been promoted from CCYL cadres.

The ties among the CCYL cadres were strong, especially among several key members. Liu Yandong, Zhang Baoshun, Li Yuanchao, Song Defu and Li Keqiang worked closely with each other for a whole decade. Liu Yandong worked with Wang Zhaoguo in the CCYL for two years in the early 1980s and worked with him in the Department of United Front between 1991 and 2002. The combined power index for the CCYL cadres is 93 points, much more than those of any of the above-mentioned factional groups.

To assess the group cohesion of the CCYL cadres in the 16th CC, we will calculate the index for the key members of the inner-circle of the CCYL. There were 18 members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCYL between 1982 and 2002. The group cohesion index of these CCYL cadres is 408.5 years. This is more than three times as much as that of the Qinghua Clique.

In terms of individual members, Li Keqiang stands out as the best connected with a total score of 95 years (Figure 1). Liu Yandong ranks second with 75 years. Others with ties over 60 years include Li Yuanchao (71 years), Zhang Baoshun (70.5 years), Song Defu (65 years), Yuan Chunqing (63.5 years), Liu Qibao (62 years), and Liu Peng (61.5 years). The initial cores of the CCYL, Wang Zhaoguo and Hu Jintao, actually do not have so strong a tie with other CCYL cadres as those above. Wang's total score is only nine years, less than one-tenth of Li Keqiang's; and Hu's score is 13 years, only about 14% of Li Keqiang's.

If the group cohesion index can provide any guidance, the CCYL Group is clearly the most cohesive factional group of all. Its group cohesion index is much larger than the group cohesion indexes of the other three factional groups combined.

3.5. *Factional overlap*

These factional groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and some of them have significant overlaps. First, it is well known that Zeng Qinghong is both a pivotal member of the Shanghai Gang and a Princeling. But he is neither the next core of the Shanghai Gang nor the core of the Princelings. It is not clear how he is able to take advantage of his dual role for his political ambitions. Second, five Shanghai Gang members are also graduates of Qinghua University: Wu Bangguo,

57. However, he was demoted in April 2003, as mentioned earlier.




Figure 1. Personal ties of former CCYL leaders in the 16th Central Committee.

Huang Ju, Hua Jianmin, Wu Qidi and Xie Qihua. In the media, the rise of the Qinghua Clique is often discussed as an antidote to the power of the Shanghai Gang. With such key members of the Shanghai Gang as Wu Bangguo and Huang Ju being Qinghua graduates, it is not clear to what extent the Qinghua Clique balances the Shanghai Gang. Third, one Shanghai Gang member is also a member of the CCYL Group. Han Zheng, a full-member of the 16th CC, was deputy secretary of the Shanghai Party Committee and executive vice mayor of Shanghai with a background in the CCYL work. He served as deputy secretary and then secretary of the Shanghai Committee of the CCYL in the 1980s. However, he is neither a member of the inner-circle of the CCYL Group nor a well-entrenched Shanghai Gang member. Personally, he is in a strategic position to benefit from this dual membership. Yet, he will in no way significantly affect the balance of political forces in these two factional groups. He recently replaced Chen Liangyu as mayor of Shanghai.

Fourth, four Princelings were also Qinghua graduates. They are Chen Yuan, Li Tielin, Liu Yandong and Xi Jinping. Although Xi later went back to Qinghua to obtain a Ph.D. degree, his college experience was different from most other Qinghua graduates, as mentioned earlier. And it is not clear to what extent he is connected to other Princelings. Chen Yuan is likely to be better acquainted with other Qinghua graduates in the 16th CC, but he is not well connected to other

Princelings in the 16th CC. Liu Yandong is likely to have better connections with other Qinghua graduates than Chen because she was more active politically. She joined the Party in 1964 and served as a political counselor at Qinghua, while Chen did not join the Party until a few years after his graduation. Finally, Li Tielin seems to have had more opportunities than all of the above to get acquainted with other Qinghua students. The existence of these members with dual membership in the Qinghua Clique and the Princelings is likely to facilitate cooperation between the two factional groups, if they are indeed operative as factions in Chinese politics.

Fifth, one Princeling is also a member of the CCYL Group: Liu Yandong. Daughter of Liu Ruilong (former vice minister of Agriculture), Liu was admitted to the Department of Chemical Engineering at Qinghua University in 1964 (while Hu Jintao was studying hub-hydropower stations in the Department of Water Conservancy Engineering). After graduation in 1970, she worked as an ordinary worker initially and then as a youth league cadre and party cadre in a factor in Beijing. In 1982, she was made a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China and vice president of the All-China Youth Federation (ACYF) (when Hu Jintao was also a member of the Secretariat of the CCYL and president of the ACYF).

Sixth, four Qinghua graduates are also members of the CCYL Group. They are Hu Jintao, Zhang Fusen, Liu Yandong and Jia Chunwang. Obviously, Liu Yandong is the only person who is a member of the Qinghua Clique, of the CCYL Group, and of the Princelings simultaneously. A key member of the CCYL, a well-connected Qinghua graduate, and a Princeling, Liu has possessed tremendous political resources and has a bright political future. She was recently promoted to director of the United Front Department of the Central Committee of the CCP as well as to vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC. Although not as well connected to other CCYL members, Hu Jintao could tap into both the Qinghua Clique and the CCYL Group for support. Jia Chunwang is less well connected to other CCYL members than Hu because he was not a member of the Secretariat of the CCYL and he was a member of the 11th CC of the CCYL only briefly (for two years). However, he is likely to be better connected to other Qinghua Clique members because of his previous positions at Qinghua as the secretary of the Qinghua Committee of the CCYL and as the director of the Student Department as well as a standing member of the Qinghua Party Committee. Zhang Fusen is also similarly situated in terms of the Qinghua Clique and the CCYL Group. He was at Qinghua long enough to make some friends and he also worked in the CCYL Beijing Committee as director of the Department of Colleges and Universities as well as deputy secretary.

Clearly, no one is completely inclusive. Nobody has a simultaneous membership in all these factional groups. Nor is there anyone who is a member of the Shanghai Gang, a member of the Qinghua Clique, and a member of the Princelings at the same time. Nor is there anyone who is a member of the Shanghai Gang, a member of the Qinghua Clique, and a member of the CCYL Group simultaneously. The same can be said of a simultaneous membership in the Shanghai Gang, the CCYL Group, and the Princelings.




Figure 2. Balance of institutional power in China (2002).

4. Conclusions

As a result of the 16th National Congress of the CCP, as Figure 2 illustrates, provincial units emerged as the most powerful institution in Chinese politics. Their power index was 246 (44% excluding the score of the political core). The combined central party and government institutions ranked second with a total score of 197 (34%). But separate central party and central government institutions were much weaker individually. The military came third with a power index of 110 points (19%). Corporate leaders began to assume independent political identities, but their power (20 points) was still negligible (3%).

Subsequent transfers, however, have significantly altered the picture. First, five provincial leaders (Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun, Hui Liangyu, Raidi and Uyunqing) and four central leaders (Wang Zhaoguo, Zeng Peiyan, Hua Jianmin and Chen Zhili) have become part of the core in the Center. The detachment of Wu Guanzheng and Li Changchun from provinces has left no provincial/ministerial leaders on the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Second, eight provincial leaders (Abul'ahat Abdurixit, Chen Kuiyuan, Li Zhaozhuo, Shen Yueyue, Wang Xudong, Wang Yunlong, Zhang Yunchuan and Zhou Yongkang) have been transferred to central institutions.⁵⁸ Third, four central leaders (Dai Xianglong, Jiang Yikang, Wang Qishan and Zhang Xuezhong) have been transferred to provinces. Consequently, the power index gap between provinces and central institutions has been significantly narrowed. Provincial units lost 36 points and gained seven points with a net loss of 29 points. Central institutions lost 19 points and gained 18 points with a net loss of one point. As a result, the provincial share (217 points) of the total index points has decreased to 40%; central institutions' share (196 points) has increased to 36%.

In terms of the informal dimension of Chinese politics, as Figure 3 illustrates, the

58. Wu Qidi was appointed vice minister of Education recently but she is not included in these cases because she had been classified as a central leader in the original scheme.




Figure 3. Balance of power among factional groups in China (2002).

CCYL Group was the most powerful factional group by a large margin. Its power index was 93 points. The Qinghua Clique was a distant second, with a score of 54 points. The Shanghai Gang was third with a power index of 44; and the Princelings were last, with a power index of 36.

These factional groups were also very diverse in terms of group cohesion (Figure 4). Again, the CCYL Group was the most cohesive group by a large margin with a total index of 408.5 points for the inner-circle members alone. The Qinghua Clique ranked second with a group cohesion index of 140.5. The Shanghai Gang




Figure 4. Group cohesion indexes of factional groups in China (2002).

was third with a combined group cohesion index of 103.17 for both party and government leaders; and the Princelings were last with a group cohesion index of only nine points.

Finally, these factional groups were not mutually exclusive. The most significant overlaps could be found between the Qinghua Clique and the Shanghai Gang, between the Princelings and the Qinghua Clique, and between the CCYL Group and the Qinghua Clique. Although two main factional groups (the Shanghai Gang and the CCYL Group) have been competing for top positions in the Party and the government, their competition has mostly appeared to be non-conflictual. It remains to be seen, however, whether they will remain competitive yet 'cooperative' in the future.