The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside

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A 1987 law established popularly elected village committees in the Chinese countryside. This article analyzes a unique set of survey data to describe and explain the connection between village leaders and those who choose them, in terms of orientation to the role of the state in the economy. It compares positions of village leaders with positions of respondents sampled from their selectorate of township-level leaders and electorates of ordinary villagers. Results of multivariate regression analyses indicate that: (1) village leaders are responsive to both old and newly emerging constituencies, as reflected in significant congruence between village leaders and their selectorate above and electorates below; (2) congruence between village leaders and their selectorate is not exclusively the result of shared local environment, informal influence, or socialization but is significantly associated with the electoral process; and (3) the causal mechanism underlying the electoral connection in the Chinese countryside is the familiar one of voter choice.

Quantitative empirical inquiry into congruence between political leaders and ordinary citizens takes as its point of departure the following claim: Leaders emerge as the outcome of a competitive political process influenced in large part by preferences of voters for particular policies. Analysis of congruence between leaders and citizens evaluates the quality of representation by measuring the extent to which the electoral connection produces a policy connection, usually as reflected in significant agreement between citizens and elected leaders or governing parties on specific issues or a general ideological dimension (see especially Achen 1978, Barnes 1977, Converse and Pierce 1986, Dalton 1985, Huber and Powell 1994, Miller and Stokes 1963, Powell 1982). By some measure, leaders in liberal democracies are supposed to be close to the center of their constituencies.

Without the theoretical premise of an electoral connection, there is little to motivate analysis of congruence. That explains the lack of comparable studies in communist states. Indeed, the key mechanism connecting leaders and citizens in those states is not designed to transform mass preferences into public policy (see Dahl 1989, Lindblom 1977, Meyer 1957). Put simply, the basic theory sustaining the communist claim to legitimate authority presumes that communist leaders are representative in the following sense: Communist Party members comprise an enlightened revolutionary vanguard that alone is able to comprehend and represent the objective long-term interests of the masses. Depending on the level of economic development and mass revolutionary consciousness, however, those interests may not correspond closely to some aggregation of preferences of ordinary citizens. Accordingly, what guarantees that communist leaders represent mass interests is not regular electoral competition but the effective monopoly of power by a hierarchically organized, internally disciplined, politically correct Communist Party elite (Lenin 1902, 1904, 1919).

 Elections in communist states are not, then, in conception or practice, public policy contests. Nor does the Leninist framework allow electoral challenges to the leading role of the Communist Party; elections are organized as fully predictable plebiscites or limited-choice elections (see Pravda 1978) in which the range of outcomes is restricted to candidates vetted and approved by Communist Party selectorate at higher levels. Such an arrangement suggests congruence between elected leaders and their selectorate, rather than electorates, but conditions for political survey research in communist states have generally not been conducive to inquiry into congruence of any sort.

Recent changes in economic and political organization in the Chinese countryside are producing a new basis for inquiry into congruence between leaders at the rural grassroots and those who choose them—not only their selectorate of leaders at the higher township level but also their electorates of ordinary villagers. At the same time, improved circumstances for research have made such an inquiry possible. This article draws on a unique set of survey data to analyze the connection between village leaders and their selectorate and electorates in terms of congruence of positions on a basic question of political economy: the importance of state management relative to private individual initiative in economic development.

The data analyzed here are from a sample of 56 Chinese villages surveyed in 1990, after passage in 1987 of a draft law establishing popularly elected village committees as autonomous organizations of power in the countryside. The analysis exploits two features of the data set that form a unique combination in survey research on mainland China: (1) a sampling design that nests the villages within 20 townships and four counties (see Appendix A), which permits matching village leaders with those who select and elect them, and (2) the commonality of many questionnaire items in elite and mass interviews, which permits matching responses to the same items. The analysis of congruence compares positions of village leaders on the role of the state in the economy with positions of respondents sampled from their township selectorates and village electorates.
For the most part, research on the new politics in the Chinese countryside has focused on informal processes and relationships (see especially Oi 1986, 1989; O’Brien and Li 1995). The relative lack of attention to formal politics is understandable. Meaningful political reform has lagged far behind economic reform, with many purportedly grand changes in political arrangements implemented only superficially or abandoned after experimentation. In addition, the unchallenged official commitment to a Leninist party monopoly of power appears inconsistent with a program of grassroots democratization.

This article describes and explains how peasants in one of the world’s few remaining communist states are influential actors in the formal politics of elections. It contributes three important—and, in context, by no means obvious—new empirical findings to our knowledge about elite-mass linkages in the Chinese countryside. First, it provides evidence of responsiveness to both old and newly emerging constituencies, reflected in significant congruence between village leaders and their selectorate above and electorates in the villages. Second, it demonstrates that congruence between village leaders and their electorates is not exclusively the result of shared local environment, informal influence, or socialization but is significantly associated with institutions of rural grassroots democratization. Third, it suggests that the causal mechanism underlying the electoral connection in the Chinese countryside is a familiar one: Voters with more choice can choose candidates closer to them in orientation.

THE NEW CONTEXT OF VILLAGE LEADERSHIP

Agricultural decollectivization dismantled rural communes and their subordinate production units, replacing them over a few years with township governments and village committees. Land and other production inputs were divided among peasant households to manage on their own, free markets were reopened, most obligatory sales to the state were abolished, and private entrepreneurship was promoted. The new incentive structure for agricultural production quickly proved successful by most economic standards, but its consequences for leadership at the rural grassroots were very serious. Decollectivization enormously weakened the state’s hold over village leaders, the dependence of villagers on those leaders, and, as a result, the power of the state to exact compliance from peasants (see Unger 1989). To manage villages as decollectivization progressed, the 1982 Constitution introduced “autonomous village committees,” but the official effort had essentially ended there. By the mid-1980s, village leadership had atrophied: Village meetings were rarely convened; peasants resisted efforts by village leaders to implement such unpopular directives as family planning; tensions erupting in violent conflicts between villagers and village leaders became common; and many village leaders abdicated positions of leadership to enrich themselves as specialized producers or entrepreneurs, while others stayed in their positions to enrich themselves through illicit means (see especially White 1992, Zheng 1989).

As a response to the deterioration of organizations and leadership at the rural grassroots, the National People’s Congress passed a draft law, effective June 1988, to reform village committees. Somewhat paradoxically, the law was designed to enhance state capacity to govern in the countryside through grassroots democratization to increase accountability of village leaders to villagers. The underlying idea was that villagers would be more responsive to leaders chosen from below rather than imposed from above. The law defined village committees as mass organizations of self-government at the grassroots, popularly elected and accountable to a village council comprised of all adult villagers. These committees of three to seven members, elected to three-year terms, were to help township governments carry out their work. Significantly, the law did not place committees under the leadership of the township governments or local party organizations (National People’s Congress 1987).

Offering villagers electoral choice was a key component of the grassroots democratization measures embodied in the law; official guidelines called for village committee elections to feature some choice among candidates. By the end of 1990, rudimentary elected village committees had by and large replaced the old committees. Most villages held semicompetitive elections, featuring one or two more candidates than the number of positions, and some villages experimented with fully competitive elections, listing twice the number of candidates as positions, but many continued the old practice of elections without choice (see O’Brien 1994).

IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRUENCE: SELECTORATES AND ELECTORATES

As Chinese officials acknowledge, grassroots democratization is a long-term process; it began not long ago, and progress has been uneven. Many village committee elections are uncompetitive, most only semicompetitive. Practically none feature campaigns. Overlapping membership on village Communist Party branches and village committees is common. Moreover, leaders at the township level, who are charged officially with organizing village elections, have an interest in maintaining the hierarchy of control over villages. What, then, are the real implications of village elections for congruence at the rural grassroots?

Consider the implications for congruence between village leaders and their selectorate. Although village leaders are not state officials, and, therefore, the superior party committee does not have formal personnel authority over those positions, party secretaries and government heads at the township level function nonetheless as selectorate. Election outcomes offer two indications that township leaders do not leave village elections entirely to the vagaries of electorates. Village committees usually have representative quotas of women (and minorities where relevant), and elected village leaders are usually also village party branch leaders (Du 1990, Liaoning Provincial Department of Civil Affairs 1989, Zhang 1992). Township party and government leaders have a number of ways to influence the selection process in village elections. In extraordinary cir-
cumstances, if village committees are “paralyzed,” town-
ship governments have the authority (indeed, the duty) to
dismantle them, conduct investigations, and ensure that
capable village leaders are elected, which can involve
sending in their own candidates from outside (Chen 1990,
Cui and Zhang 1990, Shi 1990). More commonly, town-
ship governments and party committees function as
selectorates by influencing candidate nomination and
monopolizing candidate vetting. In selecting candidates,
township leaders consider the performance of village
incumbents and rely on suggestions from the village
party branches. Candidate nomination is also supposed
to include a process of “deliberation” and “consulta-
tion,” in which villagers are mobilized in groups to
suggest and discuss potential candidates. Township lead-
ers play a more direct role as selectorates in the process
of vetting potential candidates and reducing the number
on the ballot to one or a few more candidates than
positions (see especially Fujian Provincial Department
of Civil Affairs 1990). In some villages the elections
themselves are organized so as to restrict free choice—
for example, through the use of nonsecret ballots or
voting by clapping or raising hands (see Kelliher 1996).

Township selectorates find it in their interest none-
theless to pay attention to electoral preferences of
villagers. Certainly, township leaders fear that village
leaders will be responsive to the peasants who elect
them, at the expense of higher level authorities who rely
on them as their “legs” in grassroots implementation
(Shi 1990). But village leaders who must resort to
coercive measures to enforce compliance with unpopu-
lar state policies are often ultimately unable to meet
policy objectives (Zhang 1992, Zheng 1989). Such lead-
ers may not initially lose support at the township level,
but they do lose village elections (see, e.g., Yueping
County 1990). Township leaders can fail as selectorates
if they incorrectly assess village electoral support for
candidates. Failure after elections can be more conse-
quential yet: If elected village leaders cannot elicit
cooperation from villagers, then township leaders effec-
tively lose their “legs.”

For other reasons, too, congruence between village
leaders and their selectorates does not necessarily pre-
clude congruence between village leaders and their
electorates. Chinese villages are relatively small—the
average size in 1990 was about 1,200—and most adult
villagers have lived and worked together all their life.
Even without formal campaigns and long before the
electoral process begins, villagers usually know candi-
dates personally and are familiar with their views. White
(1992) observes that because village leaders (and their
families) remain in the community after their term is up,
leaders are typically reluctant to make enemies in the
village while in office. In short, the familiarity in a small
community provides a basis for choosing village leaders
with congruent views and also creates incentives for their
responsiveness to villagers.

Moreover, although some townships have organized
uncompetitive elections, essentially continuing the old
practices of direct appointment and dismissal (Zhang
and Xiao 1992), most townships are weaker in their
capacity as selectorates. Selectorates can influence who
appears on the ballots, but winning votes in semicom-
petitive elections is usually the only way village leaders
can gain office. Many provinces require that they win by
a majority of eligible voters (see, e.g., Fujian Provincial
People’s Congress 1990). Villagers have withheld votes
for candidates supported by the township and success-
fully resisted township efforts to dismantle “paralyzed”
committes. Candidates who do not measure up in the
political vetting process have been elected as village
leaders (Li 1990). Peasants have petitioned higher level
authorities to protest electoral violations of the law on
village committees (O’Brien and Li 1995).

In sum, despite the new context of village leadership,
there remains sufficient basis to expect congruence
between village leaders and their township selectorates.
Despite a continued official commitment to Leninism,
however, there are new reasons to expect congruence
between village leaders and villagers.

MEASURING CONGRUENCE: THE ROLE OF
THE STATE IN THE ECONOMY

The state’s role in the economy is a key policy issue in
countries long dominated by central planning and state
ownership. For the Chinese, already in their second
decade of economic reform, it has become an issue of
widespread relevance. While the Chinese have not pri-
vatized state enterprises, a main thrust of economic
reform has been to promote the growth of collective and
private enterprises so as to reduce the proportionate
size of the state sector. Despite some antimarket orienta-
tion among conservative leaders, official policy in the reform
period has promoted the private sector (Young 1991). In
1989 an estimated one in seven households in the coun-
tryside owned a private enterprise (Oedegaard 1992).

The appropriate role of the state relative to private
individual initiative, as the agent to promote and man-
age economic development, is typically treated as a key
component of ideological orientation in liberal democ-
racies, with positions on the issue corresponding to
positions on a left-right dimension (see Huber 1989). It
is also a suitable focus for analysis of congruence
between village leaders and those who choose them.
Village leaders have many responsibilities, but promot-
economic development and creating an environment
in which villagers can enrich themselves are among their
most important (Zhang 1992). Village leaders act as
economic managers of small, multidimensional busi-
nesses, adapting economic directives from above to local
conditions (see Rozelle 1994). In providing economic
leadership, village leaders have a range of choices re-
reflecting fundamentally different orientations to the basic
issue of the economic role of the state relative to private
individual initiative. By contrast, state assignments such
as family planning, labor conscription, and grain pro-
curement, which undoubtedly shape the relationship
between leaders and villagers in important ways, offer
village leaders comparatively less scope for innovative
implementation. They are fairly rigid obligations handed
down the hierarchy by township governments.

To measure views on the economic role of the state, I
used two questions to evaluate the importance of state and individual private enterprises:

Here is a scale. The “0” on the scale indicates no importance and the “10” indicates extreme importance. How important would you say state enterprises are for economic development? How important would you say individual [i.e., private] enterprises are for economic development?

The broad interpretation of responses adopted here (for which I provide some empirical support below) considers them as positions on an ideological dimension that taps general orientation to the role of the state in the economy.1 A respondent’s position on the dimension is constructed by subtracting the reported position on the importance of individual enterprises from the reported position on the importance of state enterprises. Employing responses to both questions (which share the same wording and scale) has the advantage of taking into account idiosyncratic differences in implicit scales for evaluation. For the ordinary villagers, village leaders, and township leaders surveyed, Table 1 reports separately the frequency distributions for positions on the dimension.

Interpreted narrowly, positions are evaluations of the additional importance of state enterprises for economic development, relative to individual private enterprises. Positive positions assign greater importance to state enterprises than to individual enterprises. For this sample, that is by far the prevailing view in all three groups of respondents. Negative positions, by contrast, reflect the view that individual enterprises are relatively more important. A position of zero assigns equal importance to the two forms of enterprises.

Even interpreted narrowly, positions on the dimension are of obvious intrinsic interest. There is also some empirical support for a presumption that the dimension reflects more than isolated views on a specific question about enterprises. Respondents were asked a number of questions designed to tap views on the economic reforms of the 1980s. They were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement (on a four-point scale) with assertions about the effects of the economic reforms generally and, more specifically, about open markets, individual enterprises, and income inequality. They were also asked to indicate feelings (on a feeling thermometer) about private retailers and households that had prospered greatly under the rural economic reforms.2 If responses to the questions on the importance of state and individual enterprises are more broadly interpretable as orientations toward the state’s role in the economy, then they should be associated meaningfully with responses to other items on political economy.

Positions on the dimension are, indeed, associated with responses to many such items. I found that respondents who assigned relatively greater importance to state enterprises in economic development also reported significantly more negative assessments of the opportunities provided by the open market, lower appraisals of the usefulness of private enterprises, less tolerance of large income inequalities, and colder feelings toward private retailers and households that had prospered greatly under the reforms.3 These results are consistent with a somewhat broader interpretation of positions on the relative importance of state and individual enterprises—as positions that approximate the direction and

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1 In addition to evaluating the importance of state and individual enterprises, respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of collective enterprises for economic development. There is no unambiguous interpretation of those responses in a broader ideological sense, however. Most rural collective enterprises are managed by township governments or village administrations and combine administrative management and local initiative, thus sharing features of state and individual enterprises. This intermediate status, which frustrates ideological interpretation of responses, is reflected in Pearson correlations of responses. Evaluations of state and collective enterprises are highly correlated (0.47 for masses, 0.53 for leaders), as are evaluations of collective and individual enterprises (0.47 for masses, 0.35 for leaders); respondents seem to distinguish clearly between state and individual enterprises, however, as reflected in much lower correlation coefficients (0.12 for masses, 0.14 for leaders).

2 I chose to use one measure rather than some combination of these items to analyze congruence. The questions on economic reform are quite different from one another in content. An argument can be made for combining some items (those on income inequality, for example), but constructing a composite index that taps substantively different issues of political economy imposes on the data a questionable presumed coherence. Nor does the presumed coherence actually measure up well in reliability analysis (e.g., examining Cronbach’s alpha) of a scale combining the different items. The feeling thermometer items do form one factor in a factor analysis of feeling thermometer items, but my interest is congruence on issues.

3 Pearson correlations are all statistically significant ($p < .001$, two-tailed tests), relationships are in the predicted directions, and the magnitude of coefficients ranges from 0.12 to 0.21 (with more than 700 cases). Question items are reported in Appendix B.
Table 2. Regression Coefficients for Village Leaders' Position on the State's Role in the Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean position of township leaders</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean position of village masses</td>
<td>.64*</td>
<td>(33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village leader's year of birth (10^{-1})</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>(53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village leader's education*</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village leader's household income*</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>(14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village 1990 mean per-capita income (10^{-1})</td>
<td>-2.26</td>
<td>(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-21.55</td>
<td>(103.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard error of regression</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>56 villages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients; standard errors of coefficients appear in parentheses. Positions on the role of the state in the economy are constructed by subtracting the position on the importance of individual enterprises for economic development from the position on the importance of state enterprises for economic development. Question items are reported in Appendix B; variable characteristics and correlation coefficients are reported in Appendix C.

*Years of formal schooling.

An ordinal variable that categorizes reported household income for 1989 in 500-yuan and 1000-yuan brackets, from less than 500 yuan to 10,000 yuan and more.

*p ≤ .05 (one-tailed test).

**p ≤ .01 (one-tailed test).

strength of orientations toward the economic role of the state.

ESTIMATING CONGRUENCE: VILLAGE LEADERS, SELECTORATES, AND ELECTORATES

In this section I use multivariate regression analysis to inquire into the existence of statistically and substantively significant congruence between village leaders and their selectorates and electorates. The question here is straightforward: Do selectorates and electorates of village leaders matter to those leaders, as reflected in orientations toward the role of the state in the economy? In the Chinese village context of 1990, it is clearly conceivable that both, one, or neither matter—or that they have some influence on the views of village leaders but in a way not reflected in the measure employed here.

The dependent variable in the analysis is the position of the village leader on the state's role in the economy. The independent variables of main analytic interest are the mean position of ordinary villagers (aggregated by village) and the mean position of township leaders (aggregated by township) on that issue dimension. The analysis estimates the degree to which positions of village electorates and township selectorates have an effect on the positions of village leaders. Achen (1978) introduced the notion of congruence as "responsiveness" to characterize such estimates. Considered in that perspective, coefficients for the independent variables described above are interpretable as amounts by which a village leader can be expected to change position as the selectorate or electorate changes position by one unit on the dimension, other things equal.

Village leaders in the sample share a number of basic characteristics. Overwhelmingly, they are male, Communist Party members, and grew up in the village. There is more variation on other potentially relevant variables, however, which I include as control variables in the analysis: age, education, and household income.

Responsiveness is consistent with several explanations of congruence, but at least one cause does not necessarily imply responsiveness: Leaders and villagers may position themselves similarly on the state's economic role because positions are shaped by local economic environment, which they share. To rule out that explanation requires controlling for shared economic environment by including in the model an independent variable (or variables) to reflect local economic circumstances.

Lacking a measure that reflects the configuration of state and private enterprises in the local economy, which would be ideal given the model specified, I used village mean per capita income as a summary measure of economic environment.

Results of the analysis are presented in Table 2. Tests of statistical significance for control variables are two-tailed, as no direction is predicted. For the variables that aggregate positions of villagers and township leaders, I use a one-tailed test. The predicted direction of the relationship is positive.

Control variables in the model are not statistically significant.6 Turning to the two variables of analytic

equals the median. Results are similar, but with a smaller coefficient for the median median position (0.39, p = 0.08, one-tailed test). The spatial theory of elections offers no guidance in the form of a prediction that village leaders in the sample are closer to the village median position than to the mean, or vice versa. In villages with some electoral competition, more than three candidates are nominated for committee offices, and at least three are elected. If villagers vote for candidates nearest them, winners can be predicted to be nearer to the village median position than losers. Leaders in the sample are draws of one from at least three winning candidates per village, however. Among winners, leaders in the sample can be the farthest from the village median. Depending on the distribution of positions of villagers, leaders in the sample can be nearer to the village mean position than to the median.

6 I defined local economic environment at the village level, but the results of the analysis are substantially the same, with coefficients remaining stable, when township mean per capita income is substituted. I have measures of the village per-capita value of output from the private sector, but only for 40 villages. I analyzed that subset, and the measure of local economic environment was not statistically significant; other results were similar, but with a smaller coefficient for the village mean position (0.61, p = 0.09, one-tailed test).

6 The Pearson correlation of age and education is 0.41, but neither is statistically significant when the other is excluded. The lack of statistical significance for control variables may reflect their smaller variance (e.g., relative to a mass sample) and not their inherent irrelevance. In an individual-level regression model of the mass sample, with sex, age,
interest, the mean positions of township leaders and ordinary villagers are statistically significant in a direction predicted by congruence. Significance of the former is not surprising, considering the interest and practical involvement of township selectorates in choosing village leaders. The significant effect of the position of villagers is a more interesting result: Peasants are influential, even though the electoral process takes place in a formally Leninist context.

In substantive terms, too, the findings indicate that selectorates and electorates matter to village leaders. The amount of responsiveness to electorates, for example, can be expressed in the following way. The mean positions of villagers range in value from −0.33 to 5.1, a range of 5.4 points; multiplying this by the coefficient for the village mean yields a product of 3.5. As the range in positions for village leaders is 13 points, village electorates can be considered to “move” leaders more than one-fourth of the range—a result that is striking in its substantive significance.

EXPLAINING CONGRUENCE: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION

A rich theoretical and empirical literature suggests several explanations of the relationship between elections and congruence. The most obvious is inspired by a normative theoretical perspective that views representatives as delegates who act on instructions from constituents, transmitting constituency preferences (see Pitkin 1967). Competitive elections ought to produce congruence because voters can choose the candidates closest to them on some dimension. To the degree that village elections offer choices, then, voters can reject candidates with positions distant from their own in favor of candidates closer to them. The spatial theory of elections arrives at the same conclusion and suggests an additional reason to expect a relationship: Competition pushes candidates toward the constituency center to capture votes. In the two-party model of Downs (1957), competition takes the form of bunching at the median to maximize votes; in multiparty models, parties compete by dispersing along an ideological dimension (Cox 1987, 1990), but the competitor at the median is the predicted winner, in some sense of the term. The absence of campaigns in the context studied here suggests that candidate movement to capture votes is an unlikely explanation for congruence between leaders and voters. In the small village communities, information about where candidates stand is more than likely known by villagers outside (and long before) the electoral process.

A different electoral connection is suggested by Verba and Nie (1972). The competitive electoral process may encourage better communication between potential elites and masses, producing clearer understanding and agreement on the relevant issues. The logic of the relationship here is not Downian. Villagers choose candidates closest to them, but all candidates (winners and losers) are closer to villagers because of the electoral process. Elections move candidates and villagers closer together because they produce a dialogue that allows candidates to know better what ordinary villagers think.

Congruence in the Chinese village context can also emerge through mechanisms other than elections. One explanation (explored above) is shared environment. Another is informal influence by villagers, with threats of social ostracism, for example (Parish and Whyte 1978). Before decollectivization, although rural grassroots leaders were selected not elected, they were (as now) from the village community and identified closely with it, siding with villagers against the encroachment of the state and other communities (Burns 1988, Shue 1988). Such prereform linkages of villagers and their leaders—whether through shared local environment, socialization, or informal influence—have nothing at all to do with a presumed electoral connection, and there is no reason to suppose that village elections preclude such linkages.

In this section I use multivariate regression analysis to examine intervillage variation in congruence. First, I address a basic question about the effect of democratization: Is congruence between village leaders and villagers to some significant degree the product of an electoral connection? The uneven progress of democratization in the countryside supplies the basis for an answer. If democratization is an important source of congruence, then leaders in villages that are farther along in implementing the law on village committees will be closer to their village constituents in their positions on the state’s role in the economy than leaders in villages that lag behind in implementation, other things equal. Second, I attempt to sort out the causal mechanism underlying the electoral connection.

Dependent Variable: Distance between Village Leader and Village Electorate

The dependent variable used in this section measures the distance between positions of village leaders and positions of villagers on the economic role of the state. While positions of village leaders (the dependent variable above) on the dimension can be expected to depend on a variety of economic and other variables which also may affect the positions of villagers, in theory there is no reason to expect a systematic relationship between those variables and distance on the dimension.

As Achen (1978) notes, a straightforward measure of congruence, such as proximity, which he estimates as the average squared distance between a leader and constituents on some dimension, takes no account of the shape of the distribution of positions of constituents. Such a

education, and household income as independent variables and position on the state’s economic role as the dependent variable, age, sex, and income are all statistically significant. When age is taken out of the model, education is statistically significant.

7 I examined Cook’s D statistics to identify influential cases, using the heuristic suggested by Bowerman and O’Connell (1990, 468). In this analysis and others presented below, no cases were identified as influential.

8 Under plurality electoral rules whereby only one competitor can win, the predicted winner is the one nearest the median; under proportional representation, if no single party is likely to win a majority of seats, then the median party can be expected to dominate government formation (Laver and Schofield 1990, 89–143).
measure can take on a large value, indicating great distance, because constituents are sharply divided between extremes on the dimension. By contrast, the measure can take on a small value, indicating close proximity, in a very homogeneous constituency because of a narrower distribution of positions on the dimension. A simple stylized comparison illustrates the problem. In two voting districts of two voters each, with voters in one district positioned four intervals apart on some dimension of interest and voters in the other district positioned on the very same point on the dimension, a leader who is positioned exactly between voters in the former district scores lower in congruence than does a leader positioned one interval away from voters in the latter district—even though the former leader better reflects constituency positions (indeed, reflects those positions as well as possible, given their distribution). To analyze congruence between leaders and their constituents, given some distribution of positions in the constituency, requires a measure that takes the variance of the distribution into account. Achen subtracts variance from average squared distance to create such a measure.

The dependent variable in the analyses below is that latter measure of congruence. To estimate it for each village, I computed the difference in positions between the village leader and each respondent in the village sample and then squared each of those differences. For each village I then computed the mean of those squared distances. Villages with similar average distances between the leader and individual villagers can be very different in terms of how those villagers are distributed on the dimension reflecting orientation toward the state’s role in the economy. For example, villages 313 and 343 in the sample have mean squared distances of 12 and 12.6, respectively, but village 313 is much more homogeneous in its views—with a variance in mass position on the dimension of only 2.5, compared to 9.2 in village 343. To control for the contextual difference, the measure of ideological distance subtracts village variance in positions on the dimension from the village mean squared distance: For village 313 the resulting measure is 9.5, while for village 343 it is 3.4, for example. The smaller the value of the distance measure, the closer village leaders are to villagers in general; the larger the value, the more distant.

**Independent Variables of Analytic Interest**

Independent variables that test hypotheses about the effect of rural grassroots democratization on congruence between village leaders and villagers fall into three categories: institutional, attitudinal, and behavioral.

**Electoral Competitiveness and Electoral Quality.** Two institutional variables measure the quality of elections in the 56 villages. The most obvious, important, and easily measured index of progress in democratization is electoral competitiveness—the number of candidates on the ballot relative to the number of offices. Among the 56 villages surveyed, data on the relevant village committee elections are available for only 26 (spread across 9 of the 20 townships, in two counties). In order to avoid dropping observations from an already small sample, I adopted an assumption about a relatively less democratized quality of elections in the 30 villages for which electoral data are unavailable, based on the following reasoning. Data on village elections are collected at the township level by the department of civil affairs. The fact that village electoral data are unavailable suggests that the townships (or counties) in which those villages are located did not attach a high priority to implementing the draft law on village committees in 1990, when the survey was conducted. For those 30 villages, I assumed the quality of elections reflected less progress in democratization compared to the villages for which electoral data are available, and I created a dichotomous variable (one if electoral data are available, zero otherwise) reflecting the assumed difference in electoral quality. The predicted relationship between the institutional variables and the distance between the village leader and village electorate is negative. Other things equal, the more competitive and democratized the election, the smaller is the distance between the leader and villagers.

**Interest in Village Elections.** A key attitudinal variable related to democratization is mass interest in village elections. Up to the mid-1980s, Chinese peasants generally ignored elections as a means of influencing public affairs. They voted, but this was a political ritual to which they attached little practical significance (Burns 1988). Interest in the elections has obvious implications for congruence between village leaders and villagers; insofar as the latter persist in viewing elections as largely irrelevant channels of influence, that view can be self-fulfilling. Villagers who see the elections as useful channels for affecting village affairs are more likely to influence candidate selection, for example. Votes of completely uninterested villagers are similar to random draws of candidates, producing a relationship between positions of voters and winners that will be similarly random. Thus, the predicted relationship between mass interest in village elections and distance between the village leader and the village electorate is negative. Other things equal, the distance between leaders and villagers in villages with more interest in elections can be expected to be smaller than in villages where there is less interest.

**Voter Turnout and Attendance at Meetings.** Behavioral indicators of participation also can reflect interest in village elections. Voter turnout may indicate mass interest in elections, since villagers who remain uninterested are unlikely to vote. Another behavioral indicator is attendance at village meetings. Villagers who are interested in local affairs and who consider formal channels of influence useful are likely to attend village meetings, which include study sessions to learn about villagers’ rights and village committee functions, informal group deliberations in which villagers propose and discuss potential candidates, and all-village meetings in which

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9 Lack of availability refers to the fact that the data do not exist at the township level for the elections analyzed here, not that we were unable to obtain the data.
villagers nominate candidates and hear them defend their qualifications for leadership.

As indicators of interest in village elections, however, such behavioral measures may be problematic. While villagers in an Anhui community nominated 83 candidates and held five voting sessions to elect their village committee, for example, in some localities villagers participated only after mobilization efforts by election organizers (Zhang 1992). Before the recent changes in political organization, local elections and meetings had a strong mobilizational character (Burns 1988). Voter turnout and attendance at village meetings may still better reflect the ability of election organizers to mobilize villagers than the level of mass interest in elections and village affairs. Chinese accounts indicate that high turnout and high levels of participation in candidate nomination are viewed as key indicators of success in grassroots democratization. Because they are easily quantifiable, they are also useful criteria at higher political levels to evaluate township performance in organizing elections. This can transform them into performance targets. If voter turnout and attendance at meetings are products of mobilization, they can be unrelated to interest in elections and to congruence between leaders and villagers. Indeed, such mobilization can reflect an authoritarian approach to elections. If so, higher turnout and attendance at village meetings can be correlated with more, not less, distance between leaders and villagers.

For the behavioral variables, then, there are competing hypotheses about the direction of their predicted relationship with distance between the village leader and the electorate, depending on whether the measures reflect voluntary or mobilized participation.

**Control Variables**

I included in the analyses two kinds of control variables: village demographic characteristics and variables relating to village leaders and their incentive structure.

**Village Demographics.** The demographic variables are village size, mean village income per capita, and mean level of education in the village. Of the three, size appears to have clear predictable implications for congruence between leaders and villagers because of its relationship to informed voting. Chinese accounts indicate that it is more difficult to get villagers to participate in meetings and other activities associated with elections when villages are large or the population widely dispersed (see Qi 1990, Zhang 1992, Zhen and Shi 1990). As a result, villagers in those communities are less knowledgeable about their rights, village committee functions, and qualifications of specific candidates for leadership.

**Village Leaders and Their Incentive Structure.** In the sample, leaders include village committee directors and village Communist Party branch secretaries who serve concurrently as village committee deputy directors or ordinary members. While all members of village committees must be elected, party branch secretaries owe their party position mainly to higher level party organizations. Those who serve on village committees are elected to that position by villagers, but their party position does not depend on the quality of their relations with villagers. Elected or not, party branch secretaries are village leaders, and that difference may have implications for congruence. Those who owe their position of leadership only to the village electorate may better represent villagers.

A second potentially relevant dimension on which village leaders vary is experience. From one perspective, they have both incentive and opportunity to learn where villagers stand on issues that affect their daily lives. Leaders with more years of experience in village leadership may better represent prevailing issue orientations of villagers simply because they know villagers and their positions better. In 1990, however, village leaders with more experience were (by definition) those who had held power before the introduction of village elections. To the degree that more experience connotes success in meeting standards applied by selectorates before democratization, more experienced leaders may be more secure in their position and represent villagers less well.

**Results**

Results of the analyses are presented as Model 1 in Table 3. Where a direction of effect is predicted, the test of statistical significance is one-tailed; otherwise, the test is two-tailed. Two sets of results stand out. The first has to do with the electoral connection. Electoral competitiveness—the most obvious, unambiguous, and reliably measured index of grassroots democratization—is statistically significant in the predicted direction in both samples. While not statistically significant, the direction of the electoral quality coefficient in the 56-village sample is at least suggestive. Context, however different, can only make so much difference; in Chinese villages, as in other contexts, voter choice and representation go together. Notwithstanding the interest and capacity of township selectorates to influence which candidates appear on final ballots, villagers choose the winners. The more opportunity villagers have to reject some candidates in favor of others, the nearer winners are to the position of villagers who choose them.

A second set of results points to the relevance of context and has to do with political participation: Behavioral variables are significantly associated with less congruence. In the 26-village sample, mass attendance at village meetings is associated with greater distance between leaders and villagers, and the direction of the voter turnout variable is suggestive (although not statistically significant); in the 56-village sample voter turnout is associated with greater distance, and the direction of the attendance at meetings variable is suggestive.

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10 For electoral quality, p ≤ .10 (one-tailed test). Given some fairly strong correlations between independent variables (which can present a multicollinearity problem) and the small number of observations, the result is worth noting. In the 26-village sample, p ≤ .10 (one-tailed test) for mass interest in village elections; too, distance between leaders and villagers is smaller in villages with greater interest in the elections.

11 In the 26-village sample, p ≤ .10 (one-tailed test) for the voter
### Table 3. Regression Coefficients for Distance between Village Leader and Village Electorate on the State’s Role in the Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>26 villages</th>
<th>56 villages</th>
<th>26 villages</th>
<th>56 villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral quality*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—28.02 (20.55)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—25.37 (18.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral competitiveness**</td>
<td>-64.62* (33.21)</td>
<td>-42.47* (20.75)</td>
<td>-76.85** (30.45)</td>
<td>-54.06** (19.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass interest in village elections*</td>
<td>-22.55 (13.99)</td>
<td>-3.73 (6.33)</td>
<td>-20.36 (12.65)</td>
<td>-6.00 (5.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter turnout in village*</td>
<td>0.60 (0.36)</td>
<td>0.53* (0.25)</td>
<td>0.66* (0.32)</td>
<td>0.57** (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass attendance at village meetings*</td>
<td>4.69* (1.80)</td>
<td>1.37 (0.88)</td>
<td>2.18 (1.99)</td>
<td>0.62 (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional position of village leader*</td>
<td>-5.55 (6.17)</td>
<td>-1.02 (3.67)</td>
<td>-6.64 (7.38)</td>
<td>-1.25 (3.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village leadership experience*</td>
<td>-18.71 (33.14)</td>
<td>0.58 (16.39)</td>
<td>10.84 (32.83)</td>
<td>-1.73 (15.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village 1990 population (log)</td>
<td>3.21 (6.87)</td>
<td>-3.31 (3.32)</td>
<td>0.55 (6.31)</td>
<td>0.76 (3.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village 1990 mean per-capita income* (10^-3)</td>
<td>-5.45 (14.13)</td>
<td>-6.99 (8.87)</td>
<td>10.93 (14.80)</td>
<td>-0.89 (8.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass level of education*</td>
<td>-1.16 (4.23)</td>
<td>0.48 (1.93)</td>
<td>0.83 (3.92)</td>
<td>1.43 (1.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance on local problems*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>20.55* (9.48)</td>
<td>11.24** (3.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.52 (58.31)</td>
<td>12.65 (26.64)</td>
<td>-27.32 (54.32)</td>
<td>-11.94 (25.59)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| R²                    | 0.39         | 0.20         | 0.53         | 0.34         |
| Standard error of the regression | 15.75       | 11.76        | 14.19        | 10.75        |

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses. Positions on the economic role of the state are constructed by subtracting the position on the importance of individual enterprises for economic development from position on the importance of state enterprises for economic development. Distance is mean squared distance minus village mass variance in positions. Question items are reported in Appendix B; variable characteristics and correlation coefficients are reported in Appendix C.  
*Excess candidates divided by number of positions (coded zero if data are unavailable).  
**Village mean self-reported interest in village elections, four-level ordinal variable at individual level, ranging from “not interested” (low) to “very interested” (high).  
***Coded one if data are available; otherwise, percentage of eligible voters who voted.  
*****Percentage of respondents in village who reported attending a village meeting recently.  
*Made one if village committee director only; zero if also Communist Party branch secretary.  
+Number of years in any village leadership position.  
+Village mean years of formal schooling for mass respondents.  
+Mean difference between leader and village respondent evaluation of 13 local problems, four-level ordinal variable at individual level, ranging from “not a problem” (high) to “a very serious problem” (low).  
*p ≤ .05 (one-tailed test).  
**p ≤ .01 (one-tailed test).  

A reasonable interpretation is that in 1990, as in the past, easily quantifiable measures such as attendance at meetings and voter turnout reflect the ability of authorities to mobilize the masses to participate in not altogether voluntary activities. Certainly, O’Brien (1994) implies that representative village leadership is by no means necessarily associated with successful execution of unpopular state assignments; other things equal, village leaders who are better at mobilizing the masses may be poorer at representing them.

The analyses in Model 1 indicate that congruence is in significant part the result of connection involving democratized or competitive village elections, but they do not address the causal mechanism underlying the electoral connection. One perspective, suggested by Verba and Nie (1972), might consider electoral quality and competitiveness as measures of attention paid to the law on village committees. In villages where implementation of that law is taken more seriously, the electoral process presents an opportunity for a dialogue between leaders (including potential leaders) and ordinary villagers. While not incompatible with an argument that voters choose candidates closest to them in orientation, an enhanced understanding between elites and masses, not voter choice, may be the key causal mechanism underlying the electoral connection. All candidates (winners and losers) may be closer to villagers because of a process of communication in villages where the elections are given more attention.

The analyses in Model 2 are an initial attempt to sort out the mechanism underlying the electoral connection, by controlling for variation in diffuse understanding between leaders and villagers that may result from the electoral process as elite-mass dialogue. The variable added to the regression equation is based on responses of village leaders and villagers to a series of the same questions about the existence and seriousness of a variety of problems in the community: day-to-day supply of goods, medical care, income distribution, education, prices, public order, birth control, supply of energy resources, transport and communications, protection of the environment, equality of the sexes, industrial development, and agricultural development. The measure is computed at the village level: The average seriousness of each problem reported by villagers is subtracted from the village leader’s evaluation of the seriousness of the
same problem; then, the average of the distance between leader and villagers across all problems is computed. The resulting variable is the distance between the village leader's understanding of the degree to which a number of issues are problems in the community and the mean understanding of villagers.

Results of the analyses suggest that the electoral connection is not simply explained by a view of elections as opportunities for elite-mass dialogue. In both samples there is significantly greater distance in villages where leaders and villagers do not share a close understanding of local problems, but the effect of electoral competitiveness does not go away; it remains significant in the predicted direction, and the effect of electoral quality remains suggestive. Further research, focusing on process, is needed to elucidate the underlying causal mechanisms at work. Without data on all candidates, to demonstrate that winners are in fact closer to villagers than losers, the argument that congruence comes about because voters with more choice can choose candidates closer to them remains untested here. But the theoretical logic is well established, and the analyses demonstrate that congruence is in significant part the result of an electoral connection that involves voter choice per se: the more choice, the more congruence.

CONCLUSION

The changes that prompted this study are not nearly as radical as the democratic revolutions that swept away much of the communist world in 1989 and 1990. Nonetheless, the electoral connection in the Chinese countryside is also a revolution of sorts. In theory, it reverses the Leninist relationship between leaders and masses; in practice, it is transforming the relationship between leaders and ordinary citizens at the rural grassroots. As expected, village leaders are responsive to their selectors above them at the township level, but they are also responsive to the villagers who elect them. Congruence between village leaders and villagers is in significant part the result of an electoral connection that involves voter choice.

The demand for rural grassroots democratization came in the late 1980s from the top not the bottom of the communist system. Chinese leaders hoped that popularly elected village committees would fill a vacuum in leadership created by agricultural decollectivization—and restore stability and enhance compliance in rural areas. Officially, the village committees are an experiment. Nonetheless, the democracy that is slowly growing in Chinese villages is likely to have implications as profound as the changes in economic organization that created the demand for it. Most provinces have already held two or three rounds of village elections. The "mundane revolution" of voter choice appears to be catching on in the countryside of one of the world's few remaining communist powers.

12 For electoral quality, \( p \leq .10 \) (one-tailed test).

APPENDIX A. SAMPLING

The survey was conducted in four counties, one each in Anhui, Hunan, Hebei, and Tianjin. The 20 townships are a stratified probability-proportionate-to-size sample of five townships representing different population and income strata within each county. Villages are a probability-proportionate-to-size sample of three (administrative) villages within each selected township. All of the villages surveyed had undergone a round of elections after mid-1988, when the law on village committees officially took effect. The analyses in this article employ responses of villagers and their elected leaders in 56 of the villages surveyed, as well as responses of leaders at the higher township level. Four villages were omitted from the analysis because interviewers were unable to locate a village leader for interviews in one of the villages, and three village leaders failed to respond to one of the items used to construct positions on the economic role of the state.

The mass sample, considered here as a sample of electors for the village committees, consists of separate simple random samples (i.e., one per village) of resident adult villagers. Among 1,096 completed mass interviews in the 56 villages, 34% of respondents reported no position on one or both items used to construct positions on the economic role of the state, yielding 721 valid observations for analysis in the mass sample. Nearly half of all cases dropped because of missing data are respondents with no formal schooling. Nonetheless, the mass sample used for the analyses includes 119 respondents with no schooling—17% of the sample, compared to 28% of mass respondents with whom interviews were completed and who have no schooling.

The 56 elected village leaders surveyed are a nonprobability sample; 19 are directors of their village committee, and 37 are village Communist Party branch secretaries and serve concurrently as deputy directors or ordinary members of the village committee. The 40 township leaders surveyed are considered here as a sample of selectors for leaders in villages under their respective jurisdictions. They are a purposive sample, consisting of a Communist Party secretary (or deputy secretary) and a township government head (or deputy head) in each of the 20 townships surveyed. As there are 20 selectors for the 56 village leaders, each is a selector for 4 or 5 of the village leaders. That is, while electors are unique to village leaders in the sample, leaders in villages located in the same township have the same selector.

APPENDIX B. MEASUREMENT

The following survey questions were used in the analyses. Numbering refers to items in elite and mass questionnaires, respectively (or the mass questionnaire, where only mass responses were used). C4, E3. Here is a scale. The "0" on the scale indicates no importance and the "10" indicates extreme importance. How important would you say state enterprises are for economic development? How important would you say individual [i.e., private] enterprises are for economic development?

A4, A1. In what year were you born?

H1, A4. How many years of schooling have you had?

H20, G20. Please look at this card and choose a range that includes your family's total income for last year. Here under income we include salary, subsidies, pensions, payments in kind (such as grain, et cetera): under 500, 500–999, 1000–1499, 1500–1999, 2000–2499, 2500–2999, 3000–3499, 3500–3999, 4000–4999, 5000–5999, 6000–6999, 7000–7999, 8000–8999, 9000–9999, 10,000 and over.

C15. How interested are you in the elections for the village committee? Would you say you are very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not interested?

C10. Have you attended an all-village meeting recently?

Sections E and F, C and F. Now I am going to present you with a number of views. We would like you to give your opinion on each viewpoint, by stating whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree: C1a, E4a. For the vast majority, the open market has not provided opportunities to get rich. C1d, E4d. It is better not to start up individual enterprises, because there is a chance they will fail. F2d, F5b. Income ceilings should be set to prevent very large income inequalities.

F4h, F4b. Here is a card with a thermometer drawn on it. If you have good feelings about a particular kind of person, you will place them at a point between 50 and 100 degrees, according to the
strength of your feelings. And if you do not feel good about a particular kind of person, you will place them at a point between 1 and 50 degrees. If you have neither good nor bad feelings about a particular kind of person, you should choose 50 degrees. Now think about how you feel toward [read item]. At what point on this thermometer would you place them?: private retailers, 10,000 yuan households.B2, B11. Do you think any of the following are problems here? [If no, continue to next item. If yes, continue on same item.] Do you think this is a very serious problem here, serious, or not serious?: day-to-day supply of goods, medical care, income distribution, education, prices, public order, birth control, supply of energy resources, transport and communications, protection of the environment, equality of the sexes, industrial development, agricultural development.

APPENDIX C. VARIABLE CHARACTERISTICS AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

### TABLE C.1. Variable Characteristics for Analysis Presented in Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village leader's position</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>-2.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean position of township leaders</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean position of village masses</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>5.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village leader's year of birth</td>
<td>1947.54</td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td>1924.00</td>
<td>1963.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village leader's education</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>13.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village leader's household income</td>
<td>8.86</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village 1990 mean per-capita income</td>
<td>652.45</td>
<td>208.23</td>
<td>277.00</td>
<td>1469.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases: 56 villages

### TABLE C.2. Variable Characteristics for Analyses Presented in Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance between leader and electorate</td>
<td>10.06</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>66.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral competitiveness</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass interest in village elections</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter turnout in village</td>
<td>87.51</td>
<td>10.91</td>
<td>58.81</td>
<td>96.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass attendance at village meetings</td>
<td>50.04</td>
<td>33.91</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>94.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional position of village leader</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village leadership experience</td>
<td>16.77</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>38.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village 1990 population (log)</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>8.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village 1990 mean per-capita income</td>
<td>748.04</td>
<td>236.74</td>
<td>346.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass level of education</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>6.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance on local problems</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>2.65</td>
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</table>

Number of cases: 26 villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance between leader and electorate</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>11.86</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>66.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral quality</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral competitiveness</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass interest in village elections</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter turnout in village</td>
<td>40.63</td>
<td>44.65</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>96.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass attendance at village meetings</td>
<td>39.93</td>
<td>29.69</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>94.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functional position of village leader</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village leadership experience</td>
<td>17.16</td>
<td>10.05</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>38.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village 1990 population (log)</td>
<td>7.16</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>8.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village 1990 mean per-capita income</td>
<td>652.45</td>
<td>208.23</td>
<td>277.00</td>
<td>1469.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass level of education</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance on local problems</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases: 56 villages
### TABLE C.3. Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Variables in Analysis Presented in Table 2

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>.00</td>
<td>.40</td>
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Key to variables:
1. Village leader's position
2. Mean position of township leaders
3. Mean position of village masses
4. Village leader's year of birth
5. Village leader's education
6. Village leader's household income
7. Village 1990 mean per-capita income

### TABLE C.4. Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Variables in 26-village Analyses Presented in Table 3

<table>
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<th>11</th>
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</table>
1. Distance between village leader and village electorate
2. Electoral competitiveness
3. Mass interest in village elections
4. Voter turnout in village
5. Mass attendance at village meeting
6. Functional position of village leader
7. Village leadership experience
8. Village 1990 population (log)
9. Village 1990 mean per-capita income
10. Mass level of education
11. Distance on local problems

### TABLE C.5. Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Variables in 56-Village Analyses Presented in Table 3

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</tbody>
</table>
1. Distance between village leader and village electorate
2. Electoral quality
3. Electoral competitiveness
4. Mass interest in village elections
5. Voter turnout in village
6. Mass attendance at village meetings
7. Functional position of village leader
8. Village leadership experience
9. Village 1990 population (log)
10. Village 1990 mean per-capita income
11. Mass level of education
12. Distance on local problems
REFERENCES


Fujian Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, Civil Affairs Division. 1990. "Ninghua County Opens Election Campaign for Village Cadres to the Public" [in Chinese], Xiang zhen luntan (4):17.


