

**Third Party Doctrine  
Fourth Amendment considerations of  
obtaining Digital Evidence**

**National Center  
For Justice And The Rule Of Law**

*University of Mississippi  
School of Law*



*Thomas K. Clancy  
Director*

[www.NCJRL.org](http://www.NCJRL.org)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**Power points and other materials  
available at:**

**WWW. NCJRL.org**



---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI**  
**National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law**  
*The University of Mississippi School of Law*

**Publications**  
Editorial: Conference Materials, Cyber Crime Publications, Fourth Amendment Publications, Prosecution Electronic Surveillance, Criminal Access to Computers, etc.

**Cyber Crime Initiative**  
Panel: National Judicial Conference, Advisory Council on Cyber Crime, Law Enforcement Conference, Law Enforcement Conference, Cyber Crime Publications, etc.

**Fourth Amendment Initiative**  
Panel: National Judicial Conference, Law Enforcement Conference, and Office Conference, Annual Symposium, Law Enforcement, Publication, etc.

**Programs for Law Students**  
Model of Learning Program, Criminal Justice Program, Student Organizations, etc.

**About the NCJRL**  
Mission Statement, Board of Directors, Advisory Committee, etc.

**Conferences & Event Information**  
Conference and Events List by Region, National Symposium, etc.

**Law School Home • UM Home • Contact Us**

**Upcoming Events**  
October 4-7: Comprehensive Search and Seizure for Trial Judges  
October 19-22: Internet Crime Against Children: National Criminal Justice Center  
October 20-22: Cyber Security: A Conference for Educational Institutions  
March 3-5, 2011: The Future of Fourth Amendment Analysis: Gathering 100+ Experts

©2010-2011 The University of Mississippi. All rights reserved. The National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law. Professor: Terry Patrick. Last Modified: Monday, 20 Sep 2010 11:28 AM EDT.

**NCJRL.org**

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**Fourth Amendment Initiative**

**Promotes awareness of search and seizure principles**

- **Conferences for state judges**
- **Computer Searches and Seizures**
- **Annual Symposium / published lectures**

publications at [www.NCJRL.org](http://www.NCJRL.org)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**Cyber Crime and Digital Evidence Publications / Projects**

*lots* on line at [www.NCJRL.org](http://www.NCJRL.org)

*including:*

**Email delivered Cyber Crime Newsletter**

**Internet Victimization Symposium**

**Materials on computer-related crime**

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**WEBINARS on Internet Technology**

**Web Browsing 101**

**Hiding Tracks on the Web**

**Interactive Media**

**Mobile Devices**

**Peer-to-Peer Technologies**

**Emerging Uses/Cutting Edge Technologies**

recorded/ live at [NCJRL.org](http://NCJRL.org)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

*Grant-funded Judicial courses*

- Comprehensive Search and Seizure for Judges
- Searches and Seizures of Computers and Digital Devices
- Internet Crimes Against Children

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

structure of 4th Amendment analysis

IN EVERY CASE, ....

1. Does the 4th Apply?

- A. Gov't activity: "Search" or "Seizure"
- B. Protected interest

2. Is it Satisfied?

[3. Remedies?]

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

analytical structure of applicability question

1. Protected interest is necessary but not sufficient condition

focus: *individual's* interest -- privacy

2. Must be gov't invasion – "search"– of that interest.

focus: *governmental actions*.

This session assumes step #2 and focuses on step #1.

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**protected interests**

**4th:**

**"The right of the people to be SECURE in their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . . ."**

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**step #1: is object on list?**

**person, house, paper, or effect**

**step #2: quality protected?**

**does defendant have protected interest in that object implicated by gov't activity?**

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**objects protected**

**only four objects protected: persons, houses, papers, and effects**

**step #1: is object on the list?**

**(ex) open fields – not on list**

**(ex) "house" -- includes apts, hotel rooms, businesses**

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

step #2

**Privacy: main interest protected**

"The *principal object of the Amendment is the protection of privacy . . .* "

Soldal

Gov't Activity: "SEARCH"



---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**Reasonable expectation of privacy test**

1. person exhibits actual, subjective expectation of privacy
2. society recognizes that expectation as Justified / Reasonable / Legitimate

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)

*If either prong missing, no protected interest*

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**How to find "legitimate" expectation of privacy?**

*look to:*

- 1 real property law
- 2 personal property law
- 3 "understandings that are recognized or permitted in society"

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

1990s battleground

## "standing" : Guests in houses

1. *Olson*

-stayed overnight

2. *Carter*

- bagged cocaine for a couple hours



---

---

---

---

---

---


---

---

21st Century battleground

Sender (AOL)

### obtaining evidence



---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## two fundamental considerations

1. Content vs. Non-Content:

Fourth Amendment does not protect NON-content from gov't search

2. location of search for content:

Where does one have reasonable expectation of privacy so as to be able to object when gov't obtains Content ?

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

type of information is gov't seeking

**content:**  
the communication itself

**non-content:**  
addressing information

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**Obtaining NON - content**

- by "Search"
- Fourth Amendment DOES not apply

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**NON-content is not protected by Fourth Amendment**

**Pen register recorded numbers dialed by telephone**

**Smith v. MD, 442 U.S. 735 (1979):**

- robber kept calling victim
- Amendment does NOT protect non-content
- no REP in numbers dialed
  - voluntarily conveyed info to 3rd party
  - assumed risk of disclosure

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**Pen Register / Trap & Trace: gets non-content**

18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127

- get "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information"

- Not a search under 4th Amendment

*U.S. v. Forrester*, 512 F.3d 500 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008)

- to/from addresses
- IP addresses of websites visited
- volume of info to/from his account

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**Non-content Information**

- Dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information
- Basic customer or subscriber records
- Transactional information

same definitions as in SCA

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**Email Info with Pen/Trap**

- get most e-mail header information

- "To", "From"
- IP address & port
- For both source & destination

- But not

- "Subject" line of e-mails
- Content of downloaded file

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---



### Post-Cut Through Dialed Digits

- numbers dialed after call initially set up
- includes acct #s, pin numbers, ID #s, social security #, credit card #s

Content or Non-content?

- In re Application, 515 F. Supp. 2d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2007):

"functional equivalent of the human voice"

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

### URLs (uniform resource locators)

- Content or not?

www.biosupplies.com /mailorder /Anthrax.htm

host

path or "file path"

In re application, 396 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D. Mass. 2005):  
same as post-cut through digit extraction

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

### Legal requirements for Pen / Traps

- gov't can get order when 18 U.S.C. § 3123
  1. authorized attorney applies under oath for order and
  2. assert that "information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation"
- no independent judicial determination of 2  
*In re application*

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Obtaining Content

- substance of communication
- fundamental question:

does person objecting to search have reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) in info / data in location where it is found ?

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## information held by third parties

general rule: never have standing to challenge disclosure of information held by third party

ex: records of deposit at bank  
*U.S. v. Miller*, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)

*only exception to date?*

hospital records of medical tests of pregnant women indicating drug use given to law enforcement by hospital --- BUT premised on assumption woman did not consent to test  
*Ferguson v. City of Charleston*, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Traditional F/A doctrine: non-digital world

No F/A Protection from 3rd Party Disclosures to Gov't

Rationale: *Risk Analysis -- Voluntary Exposure*

- misplaced belief to whom voluntarily confides will not reveal secret  
*Miller*
- such "risk" is "probably inherent in the conditions of human society"  
*Hoffa*
- vol. exposure to public eliminates F/A protection  
*Katz*

---

---

---


---

---

---

---

---




---

---

---


---

---

---

---

---




---

---

---


---

---

---

---

---




---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

application of Fourth Amendment principles to --

1. Virtual worlds
2. cloud computing
3. web based data storage
4. email / data in transit

what are relevant considerations?

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

lower courts fairly uniform --

obtaining content --- No F/A protection

1. Email recovered from recipient
2. Internet chat rooms
3. Posting Info on a Website

- doctrines:
- voluntary exposure
  - assume risk

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010):  
*some answers?*

- cop sent text messages to wife, mistress via gov't issued pager
- agency reviewed printouts obtained from provider to determine if needed more capacity for police business

issues:

1. Quon have REP in messages?
2. Wife / mistress have REP in messages?
3. Was search Reasonable ?

See memo on  
line for  
summary

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

police pager policies

**Formal Written Policy**

- explicitly said user had no REP
- could audit, monitor, or log all activity
- not for personal use
- Quon aware of and signed

**"Informal Policy"**

- Lt. Duke: you pay overages, will not audit

---

---

---

---

---

---

---


---

**Quon: NO answers**

- "case touches issues of far reaching significance"
- concern: "broad holding" on REP "might have implications for future cases that cannot be predicted"

Therefore:

1. assumed Quon / women had REP
2. search reasonable




---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**dicta on REP analysis -- possible factors**

- Duke's statements change in policy?
- did Duke have "fact or appearance" of authority to change / guarantee REP
- should public/ private employees be treated differently
- gov't had interests to review messages:
  - performance evaluations
  - litigation on lawfulness of police actions
  - comply w/ open records laws

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

- Rapid changes in communication
- many employers expect / tolerate personal use
- **employer policies "especially"** when "clearly communicated"
- some state statutes require employers to notify when monitoring electronic communications
- uncertain evolution of **workplace norms** / law's treatment

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

- Cell phone / text messaging pervasive -- hence:
  - one view:  
  
"essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification"
  - another view:  
  
due to ubiquity / affordability employees can buy own

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

- Scalia, concurring
- Applicability discussion "unnecessary" & "exaggerated"
  - rejects "implication" about electronic privacy that Ct should decide less –  
  
The-times-they-are-a-changin' is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

- courts/ litigants likely to use dicta as "heavy-handed hint about how they should proceed"

The Court's standard



**"is (to put it mildly) unlikely to yield objective answers"**

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Sotomayor concurring in *U.S. v. Jones*,  
132 S CT 945 (2012)

Privacy does not equal secrecy

- reconsider 3<sup>rd</sup> party doctrine: "ill suited to the digital age"
- people reveal great deal of info to 3<sup>rd</sup> parties to carry out mundane tasks
  - phone numbers dialed /text to cellular providers
  - URLs visited
  - e-mail addresses to ISPs
  - books, groceries, and medications purchased online

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Sotomayor concurring

- Doubts people accept warrantless disclosure to Gov't list of Web sites visited in last week, or month, or year
- Does not assume all info voluntarily disclosed to some member of public for limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to F/A protection

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**Smiling Bob meets the 6th Circuit**



**Is email obtained from ISP protected by Fourth Amendment?**

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**Warshak #1,**  
532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)

**QUESTION not ripe:**

**privacy expectations**

- "may well shift over time"
- "shifts from internet-service agreement to internet-service agreement"
- requires knowledge about ever-evolving technologies

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**variety of agreements**

**Service providers ....**

- will **"not ... read or disclose** subscribers' e-mail to anyone except authorized users"
- "will not intentionally monitor or disclose any private email message" but "reserves the right" to do so in some cases
- right "to pre-screen, refuse or move any Content that is available via the Service"
- e-mails will be provided to government on request
- other individuals will have access to email / can use information
- **no REP** in any communications

---

---

---

---

---

---

---


---



**U.S. v. Warshak (#2),**  
631 F.3d 266 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010)

**SCA subpoena on less than probable cause violates 4th Amend**

- analogy to letters / phone calls
- ISP = post office / telephone company
- **subscriber agreement: limited access only to protect ISP**
- **not holding: subscriber agreement will *never* be broad enough to snuff out REP .... if ISP intends to "audit, inspect, and monitor" emails, might be enough**



**wikipedia**

**Email tracking**

... tracking of email messages by the sender or recipient, or by a third party, is a common practice. This is often done through the use of tracking pixels, which are small images that are embedded in the email. When the email is opened, the tracking pixel is downloaded from the sender's server, and the sender's IP address is recorded. This information can then be used to track the recipient's location and other information.

**Privacy concerns**

... tracking of email messages has raised significant privacy concerns. Many people are unaware that their email activity is being tracked, and this information can be used for a variety of purposes, including targeted advertising and surveillance. There are also concerns about the security of email data, as it is often stored on servers that are vulnerable to hacking and other security breaches.

**Tracking of email mail**

... tracking of email messages is a common practice, and it is often done through the use of tracking pixels. This information can be used to track the recipient's location and other information, and it can be used for a variety of purposes, including targeted advertising and surveillance.



solutions?

data in transit *or* stored

stored data

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Compelling Content Production: warrants

**Search Warrant: gets everything !**

- *may* always be needed when content sought
- safer course: Get warrant for *any* content

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**Carolina Academic Press**  
700 Kent Street, Durham, North Carolina 27701 (800) 489-7486 Fax (919) 489-3899

***The Fourth Amendment***  
*Its History and Interpretation*  
 Thomas K. Clancy

Click to LOOK INSIDE!  
**\$70 on Amazon**

ISBN-10: 1-59460-412-6  
 ISBN-13: 978-1-59460-412-6

[www.cap-press.com/books/1795](http://www.cap-press.com/books/1795)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

**Cyber Crime and Digital Evidence:  
Materials and Cases**

- LexisNexis (2011)
- ISBN: 9781422494080



---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---



Power points other materials  
available at:

**WWW. NCJRL.org**

- **tclancy@olemiss.edu**

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---